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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Sporadic Voters: How Attitude Change Influences Voter Turnout. (August 2006) 
Christopher T. Owens, B.A., Southern Illinois University Carbondale; M.A., Southern 
Illinois University Carbondale 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jan E. Leighley 
              Dr. David A.M. Peterson 
              
 
This dissertation investigates the important role attitudes play in determining the 
participation levels of a large number of Americans. Over the past 30 years the 
prominent theories in the political participation literature have stressed the importance of 
socioeconomic status in explaining voter turnout. More recently, some have suggested 
that voting is a habit that most Americans acquire over their lifetimes. I contend that this 
previous work is incomplete in that it overlooks a large segment of the public that I 
describe as sporadic voters. Using National Election Study panel data from the early 
1970s and 1990s, I find that neither socioeconomic status nor habit explains the voting 
behavior of sporadic voters. Sporadic voters decide to participate in elections based on 
their political attitudes at the time of any given election. If they have stronger partisan 
attachments, greater campaign interest or more external efficacy sporadic voters will be 
more likely to show up at the polls regardless of changes in education, age or income.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The study of voter turnout has focused primarily on two questions over the past several 
decades.  First, what are the determinants of who votes?  And, second, why has turnout 
declined?  Answers to the first question are generally agreed upon, and point toward 
socioeconomic status, electoral rules and elite mobilization as primary determinants.  
Along the way, one notable explanation of voter turnout, political attitudes, has been 
either discredited or ignored (both theoretically and empirically). 
 In contrast, the primary discussion regarding the second question has centered on 
attitudes such as declining partisan strength and political efficacy.  Recently, however, 
McDonald and Popkin (2001) have argued and provide intriguing evidence that in fact 
turnout has not declined as markedly as had once been believed.  Interestingly, this new 
claim suggests, too, that attitudes do not matter for voter turnout, else how could turnout 
remain relatively constant at a time when attitudinal measures are becomeing more 
negative? 
 One possible solution to the puzzle of explaining voter turnout is reflected in 
Plutzer’s introduction of the notion of habitual voting. Plutzer’s (2002) habitual voting 
framework argues that most individuals fall into two categories: habitual voter or 
habitual nonvoter.  He contends that over time habitual nonvoters will transition from 
the state of nonvoting to one of voting and will continue to vote thereafter.   If one is to  
_____________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The American Journal of Political Science. 
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subscribe to Plutzer’s habitual voting thesis, one must also consider all things equal and  
accept that variations in attitudes across elections are irrelevant to voter turnout.  In other 
words, citizens who have acquired the habit of voting vote as a “standing decision,” 
while those who do not have the habit of voting, do not vote. Yet Plutzer’s thesis, which 
implies that the electorate consists of habitual voters and habitual non-voters, ignores the 
question of how voters develop and sustain their habit.  
 I argue in this dissertation that this approach to voter turnout ignores a key 
segment of the electorate, sporadic voters, who participate in some elections but abstain 
in others and therefore a habitual behavior has not been established. The key role of 
attitudes as predictors of turnout, I argue, is that attitudinal involvement is the 
mechanism which explains why these less-than-habitual voters participate in some 
elections and stay home during others.  That is, attitudes are the key factor motivating 
sporadic voters to vote.  Further, I argue that integrating political attitudes into models of 
voter turnout helps explain two common empirical observations:  varying levels of 
turnout in presidential elections and the notably higher level of turnout observed in 
presidential vs. midterm elections. 
 
Status, Attitudes and Participation 
The relationship between socioeconomic status, attitudes and political participation has 
changed considerably over the last 35 years.  One of the early in-depth investigations of 
the relationship between socioeconomic status and political participation was conducted 
by Verba and Nie (1972).  In Participation in America the authors’ argue that 
individuals with higher incomes, greater levels of education, and higher status jobs will 
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be more likely to participate in politics (Verba and Nie 1972). Yet, as the authors note, 
socioeconomic status is only the first step in their model: “According to this model, 
social status determines to a large extent the amount to which they participate. And it 
does so through the intervening effect of a variety of ‘civic’ attitudes conducive to such 
participation- attitudes such as a sense of efficacy, of psychological involvement in 
politics, of an obligation to participate, and so on” (Verba and Nie 1972, 19).  
 In other words, attitudes in the Verba and Nie (1972) model were the 
mechanisms that determined if an individual would choose to participate in the electoral 
process. If an individual feels she has the skills to effectively participate in politics or 
that elected officials care about the problems facing citizens like themselves, that 
individual will be more likely to participate in the political process. Additionally, those 
individuals with strong attachments to the political parties and those who feel 
participation is an important part of living in a democratic society will also be more 
likely to participate in politics. Social status is important in that it generates “sets of 
attitudes conducive or inhibitory of political participation” (Verba and Nie 1972, 19).  
 Over time social status has become even more central to our understanding of 
political participation.  Theories as to how social status influences participation have 
changed considerably.  This change in conceptualization is perhaps most evident in 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s (1995) Voice of Equality in which the authors introduce 
the Civic Voluntarism Model of participation.  
 Similar to Verba and Nie (1972), Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) identify 
the significance of social status in understanding who participates in politics. The works 
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differ in how social status influences participation. According to the Civic Voluntarism 
Model, social status increases participation in two ways. First, higher status individuals 
are better equipped to overcome the costs associated with participation. Higher status 
individuals are also more likely to live and work among populations that have a greater 
likelihood of being recruited to participate in politics.   
 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) do recognize the influence of attitudes with 
the inclusion of political engagement in the Civic Voluntarism Model.  They find that 
even after controlling for education, income, institutional affiliation and civic skills 
attitudes, such as, political interest, political efficacy and partisan strength, are robust 
predictors of political participation. These authors are, however, of the opinion that 
attitudes are secondary and conceptually distinct from social status. Their view on this 
issue is evident in the statement: “If wishes were resources, then beggars would 
participate” (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 355).    
 The civic voluntarism model represents a major shift in participation theory. In 
the earlier research political attitudes were pivotal to our understanding of who is likely 
of participate in the political process (Verba and Nie 1972). Almost 25 years later 
political attitudes were relegated to the role of control variables of little importance to 
participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  
 While more recent political scholars have placed less of an emphasis on the role 
of attitudes in explaining political participation and focused more on resources and 
recruitment (mobilization), I argue it is time to reexamine the role of attitudes in 
participation theory. My assertion is drawn primarily upon the failure of cost reducing 
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policies to increase turnout. The federal government has reduced the costs associated 
with casting a ballot, yet we have seen little to no change in participation levels.  The 
same is true of the many state governments that have lessened the expenses of voting. If 
resources were the primary determinant of political participation, we would expect a 
reduction in the number of resources required  to cast a ballot would result in greater 
levels of participation, which has not been the case.     
  A number of important questions need to be addressed as we consider what we 
know about political attitudes and citizens’ likelihood of casting a ballot. Earlier scholars 
have identified a number of attitudes that influence one’s probability of voting:  strength 
of partisanship, importance of voting, campaign interest, political efficacy, and political 
alienation (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Brody 1978; Campbell et al. 1960; Verba and 
Nie 1972; Zipp 1985).  These earlier studies have relied on cross-sectional data to 
investigate attitudes and their relationship to voter turnout, which is problematic.  Cross-
sectional data may tell us which attitudes matter, but such studies cannot explain how 
one’s attitudes influence the likelihood of casting a ballot. Are attitudes simply by 
products of greater levels of education, age and income? Are attitudes stable over time? 
If attitudes change is there a change in political behavior? Such questions cannot be 
answered with cross-sectional studies.   
To gain a greater understanding of the forces that explain participation, we must 
center our attention on issues related to how attitudes might influence behavior.   The 
following inquiry begins our investigation:  Are the attitudes that influence participation 
rates observed by earlier scholars stable from one election to the next?  
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 While political scientists have shown little interest in the study of attitude 
change, social psychologists have a long history of studying attitude change, beginning 
with Hovland et al. (1953).  Later such scholars have added greatly to this earlier work 
(see Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Hastie and Parks 1986; Haugtvedt and Wegener 1994; 
Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty and Wegner 1997). However, most of the work in social 
psychology has focused on the role of persuasion, stereotypes, racial attitudes, social 
identities and issue positions.  Very few have looked at how such attitude change might 
influence political behavior and none have looked at how such change might influence 
the likelihood of voting.  
While political participation scholars have shown little interest in attitudes or 
attitude change, voter choice scholars have continued to focus on the role of political 
attitudes in determining the candidate or party individuals will support in any given 
election. Research looking at the role of attitudes and vote choice tends to fall into three 
categories: issue voting, economic voting and candidate evaluations. Most of the issue 
voting research has developed from Key’s (1966) argument that when given a clear 
alternative, some voters will make their vote choice based on the issue stances of the 
parties or candidates. A number of scholars in the 1970s argued that there was little 
empirical evidence to support issue voting (Page and Brody 1972; Popper 1972; Repass 
1971; Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976). More recent scholars contend that issue voting 
does occur, however, such voting depends on the issues under study and the decision of 
the candidates and parties to take a stand on such issues (Abramowitz 1995; Alvarez 
1997; Carmines and Stimson 1980; MacDonald, Listhau and Rabinowitz 1991; 1995). 
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The debate in the economic voting literature has revolved around the theme of 
retrospective verses prospective voting and pocketbook verses sociotropic voting 
(Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Fiorina 1981; Kinder, Adams and Gronke 1989; Miller and 
Wattenberg 1985).  While these scholars differ as to which theory they think bests 
explains vote choice, they all agree that economic conditions influence vote choice.  
Those political scientists interested in candidate evaluations assert that some voters make 
their selections based on perceived personality traits. These authors investigate how 
attitudes about a candidate’s leadership abilities, honesty, decency, and ability to set a 
good moral example influence individual vote choice (Goren 2003; Kinder 1986; Rahn 
et al. 1990; Rosenberg and McCafferty 1985). 
A second query in our investigation is, if vote choice scholars have continued to 
study the influence of attitudes, why have participation scholars in more recent years 
placed attitudes on the “back burner” of research?  One reason may be that most scholars 
believe that the attitudes which influence participation are very stable over time (Huddy 
2002). There is very little research to support such a conclusion. For example, party 
identification has been found to be established early in life and highly resistant to change 
over the course of one’s lifetime (Converse and Markus 1979; Markus 1982). A 
conclusion of the stability in one’s attitudes of voting participation depends on how one 
defines stability.  If, by stability we mean not moving from Democrat to Republican 
overtime, one can conclude that such attitudes are very stable.  Yet, if we were to expand 
our definition to the likelihood of placing oneself at the same point along the standard 
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seven point continuum from strong Democrat to strong Republican then partisanship 
looks much less stable overtime (Krosnick 1991). 
Research on other attitudes believed to influence likelihood of voting such as 
external political efficacy has found little stability overtime (Krosnick 1991; Sears 
1980). Research on the stability of campaign interest, voting importance and alienation 
from one election to the next is non-existent.  Considering our lack of empirical 
understanding as to how voting participation attitudes change from one election to the 
next, it is not surprising that we know very little about how any changes in attitudes over 
time such as, partisan strength and political efficacy, might alter one’s likelihood of 
casting a ballot.   
If we were to find that attitudes do change from one election to the next and that 
this change can influence one’s likelihood of voting we are left with two more important 
questions: (1) what causes attitude change and (2) who in the population is influenced by 
attitude change. Potential answers to the first question will be discussed and partially 
explored later. The answer to the second question, I will argue, is likely to be found 
among individuals who move in and out of the voting population.     
 
What about the Sporadic Voters? 
As I mention above, participation scholars over the last thirty years have tended to 
classify individuals as voters or nonvoters. Their primary conclusion has been that social 
status best differentiates those who are able to cast a ballot from those who cannot 
overcome the costs associated with voting.  While Plutzer (2002) attempts to advance 
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our understanding of political participation, he, too, only focuses on two categories, 
habitual voter and habitual nonvoters.    
In Figure 1 we see voter turnout for the last 12 presidential elections. The solid 
bars represent the percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in each election, while 
the striped bars represent the percentage that abstained.1  Most scholars have focused 
their attention on differences in the individuals that make up the two respective bars. 
Resource based models have found that individuals who vote (the solid bar) have greater 
resources, live in states with less restrictive registration laws and are more likely to have 
been mobilized to vote (Jackman 1987; Powell 1986; Rosenstone and Hansen  
1993; Leighley 2001; Timpone 1998; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Plutzer (2002) argues that once an  
individual moves from the nonvoting population (the striped bars) to the voting 
population (the solid bars) she will remain in the voting population in subsequent 
elections.  
This dissertation differs in that I seek to explain the fluctuation in the height of 
the bars observed in Figure 1.1 from one election to the next.  These fluctuations in 
turnout suggest that a large number of Americans move in and out of the electorate from 
one election to the next. For these individuals, voting does not appear to be a habit but 
instead a sporadic behavior.   
I am not the first to recognize these individuals.  Campbell (1960) argues that 
among all eligible voters there is a significant number of peripheral voters who will only 
                                                 
1
 Turnout data were obtained from the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate website 
(http://fpc.state.gov/26213.htm).  
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cast a ballot in high stimulus elections. Using the 1948 and 1952 elections as an 
example, Campbell (1960) shows that Eisenhower’s 1952 victory was the result of a 
large number of nonvoters in 1948 turning out in 1952 to support the Republican  
 
Figure 1.1   Presidential Election Turnout 1960-2004 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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candidate.  While Campbell speculates that these new voters in 1952 turned out because 
of an increase in political interests, he does not empirically test this assumption.  
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Sigelman et al. (1985), using the five year voting histories of Kentucky voters, 
point out that a large number of individuals fall into the category of marginal voters.  
They offer cross-sectional evidence that both sociological and psychological measures 
explain the number of elections all respondents participated in over the five year period. 
However, the authors do not attempt to compare marginal voters to other respondents, 
nor do they posit a theory that might explain why marginal voters decide to participate in 
some elections and not others. While these scholars have recognized a significant 
number of Americans are sporadic in their voting behavior, to date, a number of 
important questions remain unanswered about this group, long overlooked in voter 
participation literature.  
 In this dissertation I will expand upon this earlier work by developing a theory to 
explain the behavior of sporadic voters. I use this theory to explain fluctuations in both 
presidential and congressional elections. Finally, I attempt to take an initial step in 
understanding the mechanisms that facilitate attitude change as it relates to voter turnout. 
If attitude change over time influences participation levels, identifying the forces behind 
that change is essential if we are to accurately explain and predict the electoral process.   
     
Chapter Structure, Data and Findings 
In Chapter II, I will review the literature on political participation and further develop a 
theory to explain the behavior of sporadic voters. This chapter also posits a number of 
testable hypotheses.  In Chapter III I address two important questions. First, are attitudes 
stable from one presidential election to the next? Second, do changes in political 
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attitudes influence sporadic voters differently than habitual and nonvoters? To answer 
these questions, I utilize data from the 72-76 NES Panel Study and the NES 90-92 Panel 
Study. The findings in this chapter advance our understanding of the connection between 
political attitudes and their influence on voting behavior. Although a number of these 
attitudes do change from one election to the next, these changes do not have the same 
effect on all potential voters: only among sporadic voters does attitude change influence 
their likelihood of showing up at the polls.  
In Chapter IV I expand the study of sporadic voters to congressional elections. 
This chapter asks the question: Can the surge and decline in voter turnout observed 
between presidential and congressional elections be explained by the behavior of 
sporadic voters?  To answer this question, I use panel data from the 1972 and 1974 
elections. The results in this chapter, though not as definitive as those in Chapter III, do 
reveal some interesting findings. Campaign interest appears to have the same influence 
on congressional election turnout for all voters. On the other hand, as in Chapter II, 
changes in attitudes such as voting importance, political efficacy and alienation, 
influence the decision to vote only for sporadic voters.  
The final empirical chapter deviates from the previous chapters in that the focus 
is not on sporadic voters, but voters in general. At the heart of this dissertation is the 
argument that attitude change is important to our understanding of political participation. 
Such a statement begs the question, what factors induce attitude change? While 
socioeconomic status is fairly stable over time, political context is not. Issues, 
candidates, media coverage and the behavior of political parties all change from one 
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election to the next making them likely areas of interest in the study of attitude change. 
In the final chapter of this dissertation I attempt to link one of the likely contextual 
forces that influences attitude change.  
 Chapter V addresses two questions: (1) Do attitudes have the same influence on 
behavior in more recent elections as were found in earlier studies and (2)  What 
influence does elite mobilization have on political attitudes?  To answer the questions 
raised in this chapter I examine NES data from the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections.  
The findings in this chapter suggest that political attitudes remain a significant and 
substantive influence on voter turnout in present day presidential elections. More 
importantly is the finding that the influence of elite mobilization is mediated by political 
attitudes, which suggests that one of the factors that explains attitudes in any given 
election is that of political mobilization.    
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CHAPTER II 
EXPLAINING VOTER TURNOUT 
 
 
In Polyarchy, Robert Dahl (1971) describes three necessary conditions under which all 
citizens must live for a nation to be considered a democracy. First, citizens must be 
allowed to determine their governmental preferences.  This includes the right to join 
organizations and the opportunity to seek out alternative sources of information.  
Second, they must be allowed to let their opinions be known to either the government or 
other citizens. To do so, there must be free and fair elections with all full citizens 
allowed participation.  Finally, the preferences of all citizens must be of equal weight.  
To achieve this, political leaders must be allowed to compete for the support of all 
citizens and the votes and opinions of the citizenry must in some way determine the 
institutions responsible for making public policy (Dahl 1971, 2-4). 
Given the importance of citizen participation in a democratic system a dominant 
topic in political science literature is the question of why some individuals choose to cast 
a ballot and others do not.  As noted in the previous chapter, studies of voter turnout tend 
to emphasize the legal context, individual attributes, and the character of the choice 
situation.   
 
Resource Based Models  
The backbone of resource based models is rational choice theory.  Introduced by 
Anthony Downs (1957) and further developed by Riker and Ordeshook (1973), rational 
choice theory stresses the costs and benefits associated with political participation. Like 
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buying a new car or deciding where to go for vacation, individuals calculate the costs 
and benefits associated with political participation when determining their behavior.  If 
an individual perceives that the costs are greater than the benefits she will abstain from 
casting a ballot. 
 The costs associated with voting are fairly straightforward.  At a minimum a 
voter must register, find their poll’s location, take the time to visit the poll on election 
day and cast a ballot. Other potential costs related to voting include following the 
campaign, learning about the issues and where the candidates and parties stand on those 
issues. Finally, the individual must determine which of the candidates hold issue stances 
closest to that of his or her own issue positions.2  
 The benefits associated with voting are less clear and more difficult to 
empirically test.  As previous authors have noted, the expected benefit of casting the 
deciding ballot in the election is highly unlikely and therefore not a reasonable benefit to 
expect. Because of this shortcoming in the theory Riker and Ordeshook (1968) introduce 
the “D” term to the standard rational choice equation.  This additive term represents 
personal benefits one might receive from the act of voting. For example, voting in 
elections may provide internal or symbolic rewards. Some may see voting as a civic duty 
or be motivated by their strong support for a candidate or party. Yet, such factors are 
hard to quantify and cam be endogenous (Leighley 1991). Therefore most participation 
scholars have focused their research on the costs associated with casting a ballot and the 
factors that help individuals overcome those costs.  
                                                 
2
 Aldrich (1993) challenges the primus that voting is costly. He suggests that in most cases voting is both 
low in cost and low in benefit.   
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The prevailing theory in the participation literature is the standard socioeconomic 
model (SES).  This theory stresses the individual’s socioeconomic status and civic 
orientations to explain political participation.  In their classic Participation in America, 
Verba and Nie (1972) argue that individuals are more likely to participate if they have 
the resources (time, money and skills) and civic orientations to do so.  The higher a 
person’s status, they argue, the more likely the individual to work and live in an 
environment that stresses participation and positive attitudes toward politics in general. 
 Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) argue that education is the single most 
important determinant of voting.  They suggest increased education improves 
participation in three ways.  First, education increases cognitive skills.  Higher education 
levels give individuals the ability to understand more complex ideas and handle subjects 
that are more abstract in nature, both of which are common to the political process. 
Second, education leads to greater gratification when one participates in politics.  
Educated citizens are more likely to be aware that voting is their civic duty, which 
results in greater moral pressure to cast their ballot. Third, education gives one 
experience in dealing with situations common to the bureaucratic process.          
 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) suggest that SES explains individuals’ 
decisions to participate because it reflects the resources acquired through the individual’s 
life cycle.  Though they do not deny the influence of education, they point out that it is 
just one of many factors such as church attendance, job type, and organizational 
membership that determine the skills individuals possess. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
argue that an understanding of how political skills are developed is important because 
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citizens may choose not to participate “because they can’t, because they don’t want to, 
or because nobody asked” (1995, 15).  
 A second area of research that focuses on the costs associated with voting are 
studies that examine the role legal context plays in determining participation rates. The 
legal context includes laws regarding voter registration, ballot design, and voting 
systems.  These vary by state, and therefore vary among individuals. As Rusk (1974) 
argues, such environmental factors can "have important effects in influencing and 
shaping voting behavior" (1044). 
Registration laws are the most studied of the legal contexts.  Research has shown 
that states with more restrictive registration policies tend to have lower levels of voter 
turnout (Jackman 1987; Powell 1986; Timpone 1998; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) argue that if states would eliminate registration-
closing dates, make registration easier and relax absentee registration requirements, 
voter turnout could increase by about10 percent.   
 Like SES, such studies are anchored in the rational choice tradition (Aldrich 
1993; Downs 1957; Jackman 1992).  Institutional rules impose a cost on voting.  If their 
costs are reduced, individuals are expected to be more willing and able cast their ballot 
on election day. Unfortunately, though many steps have been taken to reduce the cost of 
voting (i.e. motor-voter, early voting, voting by mail and election day registration) little 
evidence has been found to suggest that more citizens are casting ballots (Berinsky, 
Burns and Traugott 2001;Erikson 1981; Knack 1995; Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997; 
Rhine 1995). 
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 The influence of elite mobilization on participation levels is well documented in 
the literature.  Research has shown that when parties and candidates canvass the 
electorate, voter turnout levels increase (Adams and Smith 1980; Gerber and Green 
2000; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994).  Others have 
found that individuals are more likely to participate in politics when asked to vote by a 
candidate, political party, or friend (Leighley 2001; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  
Calhoun-Brown (1996) found that the relationship between black turnout and church 
attendance can best be explained by the mobilization efforts of African-American clergy 
and other church leaders.   
 In their extensive study of turnout trends over a 36 year period, Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) conclude that variations in mobilization efforts of elites explain over 50% 
of the decrease in self reported voter turnout witnessed since 1960. They argue that 
variations in mobilization efforts were caused by changes in campaign strategies by 
candidates and parties, fewer competitive elections, contested presidential primaries, and 
the decline of social movement activity (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 218).   
 Like the previous two models discussed above the most prominent explanation as 
to why mobilization increases turnout relates to lowering the costs of voting.  The 
mobilization efforts of parties, candidates and interest groups lower the cost of voting by 
providing information about registration, voting locations and absentee ballots or 
providing travel to and from the polling place (Adams and Smith 1980;Gerber and Green 
2000; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992;  Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Leighley 2001).   
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 Though resource based models do a good job of explaining who is likely to 
participate in politics, as Leighley (2002) points out, they give us little leverage on the 
question of why individuals are willing to do so.  A person may possess the skills to 
perform multiple tasks, but the decision of which tasks are worth the time or effort is 
determined by one’s attitudes about the options available.  In other words, if we want to 
explain why individuals choose to participate in politics, we must not only consider the 
skills and resources individuals bring to political arena, but also determine their attitudes 
about the options available once they arrive.  
 
Attitude Based Models 
At one time the role of attitudes in explaining behavior was prominent in the literature.  
By far the most investigated topic was political efficacy (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; 
Ashenfelter and Kelly 1975; Cassel and Hill 1981; Citrin 1974; Craig 1979; Shaffer 
1981).  Though opinions differed as to the questions used and the modeling techniques 
utilized to measure internal and external efficacy, most find that individuals possessing 
low levels of internal and external efficacy were less likely to participate in politics.   
 Later scholars have pointed to potential problems with using attitude measures 
like political efficacy as independent variables to explain voter turnout (Finkel 1985; 
Leighley 1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  As Leighley (1995) explains, 
measures of an individual’s attitudes often do not take into consideration the influence 
participation can have on attitudes under study.  If participation enhances feelings of 
efficacy, then estimates of the effect of efficacy on participation will be inflated.  
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“Hence, evidence regarding the centrality of attitudes to participation must be interpreted 
with this in mind” (186).  
  When attitude measures are used to predict voting there is a potential for 
problems of endogeneity.  There are often reciprocal effects associated with political 
participation. For instance, one’s partisan strength and political alienation not only 
influences her likelihood of voting; consequently, the act of voting can influence one’s 
level of partisan strength and political alienation. Ignoring this reciprocal relationship 
can inflate the predicted influence of attitudes on one’s decision to participate in the 
political process. 
 A second, and often overlooked, area of the attitudes literature relates not 
feelings of one’s political abilities or government’s responsiveness to one’s needs (i.e. 
internal and external efficacy) but instead focuses on the options available in any given 
election.  Reiter (1979) suggested that perhaps one reason lower status whites participate 
less in elections is the lack of a viable socialist party in the ballot.  Zipp and Smith 
(1982) found that lower class Canadians were more likely to vote when the “mildly 
socialist party” was running a candidate in their district.   
 Campbell et al. (1960) found that turnout increased when there were perceived 
attractive alternatives between the parties in any given election.   Beck and Jennings 
(1979) suggest that the variations in political participation, by both young and old, can 
be explained by the issue stances taken by political leaders.  Hill and Leighley (1993) 
found that as the ideological differences between political parties within a state 
increased, participation within that state also increased.   
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 Such findings point to the importance of measuring what Brody (1978) describes 
as alienation and indifference.  Alienation describes how negatively or positively an 
individual feels toward offered alternatives.  If the individual has a negative attitude 
toward the parties and candidates in any given election, then she is considered alienated 
and therefore less likely to participate.3   
Indifference describes the amount of contrast the individual perceives in the 
political environment.  This differs from alienation in that the attitudes need not be 
negative.  A citizen can hold positive evaluations of all viable parties and candidates.  If 
the evaluations are so close that the individual sees no difference between the candidates 
or parties, the individual is indifferent as to the outcome of the election, making him or 
her less likely to cast a ballot.  
 Though most recent studies of individual turnout have ignored attitudes of 
alienation and indifference, earlier studies suggest that the inclusion of such measures 
could be beneficial.  Brody and Page (1973), in their study of the 1968 presidential 
election, found that respondents who summarized both candidates and parties negatively 
were less likely to cast a ballot.  They also found that those respondents who evaluated 
both candidates and parties the same were also more likely not to participate  
Zipp (1985) took a different approach to the study of indifference and alienation.  
Instead of asking respondents directly about the candidates or parties, he used issue 
questions to construct his measures.  Respondents who perceived their own issue stances 
and those of both presidential candidates to be the same were considered to be 
                                                 
3
 For an alternative conceptualization of political alienation see Chen (1992). 
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indifferent.  Respondents who perceived their issue stances and those of both 
presidential candidates to be different were considered to be alienated.  Applying these 
measures to four presidential elections, Zipp (1985) found that in every election 
respondents displaying attitudes of indifference and alienation were less likely to 
participate. 
Voting as a Habit 
Recent research has attempted to move in a new direction by recasting political 
participation as a habit-forming endeavor (Green and Shachar 2000; Plutzer 2002; 
Gerber, Green and Schachar, 2003).  These authors argue that regardless of the legal 
barriers and individual attributes, a large number of citizens eventually move from being 
habitual nonvoters to habitual voters.  Plutzer (2002) argues that the individual factors 
suggested by earlier authors attempting to explain political participation are incomplete. 
Plutzer 2002 notes: 
The twin foci of resources and costs have yielded a large number of research 
findings but not a good sense of how the many factors fit together or when and 
where variables will matter most. That is, the many findings do not yield a set of 
conditions and qualification that marks a mature theory (41).   
Using Jennings and Niemi’s three-wave Student-Parent Socialization Study 
(Jennings 1972; Jennings and Niemi 1991; Jennings, Markus and Niemi 1991), Plutzer 
takes a closer look at the factors that influence the probability of voting over time. Using 
latent growth curve models, he tracks respondents’ voting patterns in the 1968, 1972, 
1976, and 1980 elections.  
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Plutzer (2002) finds that individual factors such as education and income explain 
when habitual nonvoters will become habitual voters. However, such factors tell us little 
about why voters continue to vote. In fact, characteristics such as education, political 
knowledge and income become less important as individuals advance in age. For 
example, among those who were first eligible to vote in 1968, college graduates had 
around a .58 probability of voting, while those who had never attended college had about 
a .41 probability of casting a ballot. By 1980, not only had all respondents in the cohort 
become much more likely to vote, the gap had narrowed significantly, with college 
graduates having a .90 probability of voting and those with no college having a .85 
probability (Plutzer 2002, 52).  
By following respondents’ voting patterns over time Plutzer (2002) also finds 
that once an individual decides to vote for the first time, she usually moves from being a 
habitual nonvoter to a habitual voter.  Plutzer concludes that voting can best be 
understood through a developmental framework.  In this framework traditional measures 
of social background and SES explain when an individual will likely enter the voting 
population followed by a second set of forces, which he describes as inertia keep a voter 
repeating the behavior.  
As Plutzer recognizes, the data set he uses has two potentially serious flaws.  
First, the cohort under examination came of age during one of the most politically 
volatile periods in this country’s history.  Events like the war in Vietnam and the Civil 
Rights movement may have shaped the cohort’s political behavior in a way as to make 
them distinct from subsequent cohorts.  
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Second, and what I would argue is potentially the most damaging shortcoming is 
that those conducting the survey dropped a significant number of respondents. The first 
wave of the panel was taken in 1965 when the respondents were students in high school. 
In the second wave of the study in 1973 all the students who had dropped out of school 
were removed from the study, which resulted in 27 percent of the initial cohort being 
excluded from the study.  Considering the likely social and racial make up of those 
dropped from the study, the ability to generalize the results reported by Plutzer (2002) is 
almost certainly limited. Before we can determine the validity of the habitual voter 
framework a test on a more representative sample is needed.  
 
Sporadic Voters 
How might we define sporadic voters?  The broadest definition of a sporadic voter 
would be one who votes in some, but not all, elections including federal and local 
elections. However, a lack of data across all such elections over time makes empirical 
examination impossible.  If we limit our definition of sporadic voters to observed 
behavior in presidential and congressional elections the ability to examine the behavior 
of these individuals becomes promising. For the purposes of this research I define 
sporadic voters as individuals who have voted in some but not all federal elections for 
which they are eligible. In other words these are individuals that do not fall neatly into 
Plutzer’s (2002) habitual voter or nonvoter categorizes.  
While Plutzer recognizes habitual voters may miss an election from time to time, 
he suggests that it is due to factors outside their control. He writes: “Of course, habitual 
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voters are thwarted from voting in a particular election” (Plutzer 2002, 42). Yet he does 
not entertain the theoretic possibility that some individuals may abstain do to their 
personal decision to do so and not by forces beyond their control.    
Using more established political participation theories to explain the behavior of 
sporadic voters is difficult.  Resource based theories are impractical because such factors 
tend to be stable and are unlikely to change a great deal from one election to the next. 
For example, education level, the most prominent resource measure in the literature, 
rarely changes beyond one’s early twenties.  Also, the voting rates of those individuals 
most likely to have their education level change over a four year period (i.e. 18-30 year 
olds) have consistently been the least likely individuals participate in elections. 
Considering education’s stability, it is unlikely that fluctuations in voter turnout could be 
explained by changes in the electorate’s education level from one election to the next. 
 Institutional structures, a second factor scholars have found to explain 
participation rates, are another area unlikely to be helpful in explaining fluctuations in 
voter turnout. Eligibility requirements and registration closing dates tend to be very 
stable from one election to the next.  As noted earlier, the few institutional changes that 
have taken place at the federal and state level have had little influence on participation 
rates (Berinsky, Burns and Traugott 2001;Erikson 1981; Knack 1995; Stein and Garcia-
Monet 1997; Rhine 1995). 
 Changes in mobilization strategies are another unlikely candidate. Though 
mobilization is effective, it is not universal and is often conditioned on who initiates the 
contact. Political elites strategically target mobilization efforts, primarily focusing effort 
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on partisans who have shown a propensity to vote in the past (Huckfeldt and Sprague 
1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Leighley 2001).  
 If parties and candidates focus their mobilization efforts on previous voters, it is 
unlikely their behavior would bring a large number of individuals in or out of the 
electorate unless the intensity of their efforts varies greatly from one election to the next. 
However, the percentage of respondents reporting contact in the National Election Study 
(NES) has been very stable in recent presidential elections. Between 1984 and 2000 the 
mean number of respondents reporting party contact prior to each presidential election 
was 10% with a standard deviation of 1%.4   For a more specific example let’s compare 
the 1992 and 1996 elections. In 1992 55% of eligible citizens chose to cast a ballot. In 
that same year 9.5% of NES respondents reported being contacted prior to the election. 
In the 1996 presidential election turnout dropped 6% to 49%, while the percentage of 
NES respondents reporting contact only dropped .4% to 9.1%.    
Finally, the habitual voting framework does a poor job of explaining changes in 
voter turnout from one election to the next. If nonvoters transitioned to being habitual 
voters, we would expect the number of voters to increase from one election or at a 
minimum remain stable unless there was a drop in the number of eligible voters. Yet, 
between the 1992 and the 1996 presidential elections we observed a decrease in turnout 
of 11.7 million voters and a 6.9 million increase in the number of eligible voters.5 These 
would mean that, assuming none of the 6.9 million new eligible voters abstained, at a 
                                                 
4
 Information taken from the cumulative American National Election Study available at 
http://www.umich.edu/~nes/.   
5
 Data was obtained from the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate website 
http://fpc.state.gov/26213.htm.  
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minimum 11.7 million individuals that cast a ballot in the 1992 election had not acquired 
the habit of voting. 
Because traditional and more recent theories of political participation are 
unlikely to explain the behavior of sporadic voters, I argue the answer can be found in 
changing attitudes. Elections do not occur in a vacuum.  Citizens are exposed to media 
coverage and conversations with friends and family.  This exposure shapes their 
attitudes, about themselves and their place within the political sphere. This exposure can 
also change from election to election.  Individuals move. They get promotions and lose 
their jobs. The parties change candidates and issues.   All of these changes could lead to 
a change in one’s attitudes toward her political environment and the environment’s 
orientation to the individual. 
As noted above, attitudes have been found to influence the likelihood an 
individual will cast a ballot (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Ashenfelter and Kelly 1975; 
Brody and Page 1973; Campbell et al. 1960; Cassel and Hill 1981; Citrin 1974; Craig 
1979; Shaffer 1981; Zipp 1985). Such studies have been limited to cross-sectional data 
and have treated the influences of attitudes as universal across all potential voters.  
Furthermore, more recent research has no role for attitudes in the theoretical 
explanation of voter turnout.  The habitual voter framework suggests that “inertia” 
explains why individuals move from a state of habitual nonvoting to a state of habitual 
voting (Plutzer 2002).6  If an individual’s behavior is a habit, it implies she will repeat 
this behavior regardless of her attitude about the behavior.  
                                                 
6
 Plutzer (2002, 43) acknowledges he has no theoretical explanation of the nature of inertia.     
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Though, as noted earlier, turnout patterns suggest that a large number of 
Americans display behavior inconsistent with the habitual voter framework. These 
individuals appear to be sporadic voters because they move in and out of the political 
arena. Since sporadic voters do not habitually vote or habitually not vote, if one were to 
expect to find the influence of attitudes on the likelihood of casting a ballot, it would be 
among sporadic voters.  
Therefore, I argue that sporadic voters’ attitudes about themselves and their 
political environment influence their decision to participate in any given election.  
Sporadic voters whose attitudes become more positive will be more likely to vote.  
Because habitual voters and nonvoters are predisposed to repeat the same behavior 
attitudes will not influence their likelihood of voting. Consequently, I have two testable 
hypotheses: 
H1: Sporadic voters with “positive” attitude changes from one election to the 
next are more likely to vote than sporadic voters with no or negative changes.  
 
H2: Changes in attitudes between elections will not influence the likelihood a 
habitual voter or habitual nonvoter will cast a ballot.    
 
Sporadic Voters and Surge and Decline 
Looking at the figure on page 31 we see voter turnout in presidential and midterm 
elections from 1980 through 2004.  In the previous section, I discussed the fluctuations 
in voter turnout from one presidential election to the next. It is evident that there are 
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even greater fluctuations between presidential and midterm elections. Over that 24 year 
period, presidential election turnout averaged 53% while midterm election turnout 
averaged 37%. These drops in turnout in midterm elections are known in the literature as 
the surge and decline phenomena (Campbell 1960; 1966).  Campbell’s (1960; 1966) 
original theory of surge and decline was an attempt to explain why the president’s party 
tended to lose seats in midterm elections. He argued that because presidential elections 
are high profile events a large number of peripheral partisans and independents surge to 
the polls in support of the winning candidate. Two years later in the low profile midterm 
elections these peripheral voters do not turnout out to vote, which results in the 
president’s party receiving considerably less support and a loss in congressional seats 
(Campbell 1960; 1966).    
 A number of scholars over the years have found support for Campbell’s original 
theory of surge and decline (Bron 1990; Campbell 1987; 1991; 1997; Cover 1985; 
DeNardo 1980). Campbell (1987) revised the theory to include the influence of partisans 
from the losing presidential candidate’s party that abstain during the presidential and 
then return to voting in the midterm election. Examining presidential elections from 
1956 to 1980, Campbell (1987) finds a strong negative correlation between Democratic 
vote share and the percentage of Republicans that turnout to support their candidate. He 
concludes that such a relationship supports the idea that when short-term forces are 
against one party in presidential elections it will have a damping effect on that party’s 
turnout. However, two years later when those forces are not present, partisans from the 
losing party in the previous presidential election return to the polls (Campbell 1987). 
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Work on surge and decline has been primarily dependent on aggregate or cross-
sectional data.  While assumptions are made about the influence short-term forces have 
on such attitudes as partisan strength and campaign interest, attempts to empirically test 
these assumptions are non-existent. Other than Campbell (1960), scholars have ignored 
fluctuations in presidential elections or attempted to determine if the forces influencing 
the variation in presidential elections are the same as those influencing congressional 
elections.       
Congressional scholars have found that district level turnout can be influenced by 
such factors as campaign spending and challenger quality (Cox and Munger 1989; 
Jackson 1996; Jacobson 1978; 1990; 1992; Gilliam 1985). Such findings suggest that 
high profile congressional elections can draw individuals to the polls that would not 
normally participate in midterm elections. Yet, as Jackson (1996) points out, over time 
fewer and fewer congressional districts are competitive, which would imply that the 
number of individuals on a national level likely to be drawn to the polls would be small. 
Such an assumption is supported by the much smaller variation in midterm election 
turnout, when compared to that of presidential elections (see Figure 2.1). 
We have a well developed theory of surge and decline to explain why turnout in 
congressional elections is much lower than that in presidential elections. Though to date, 
we have little empirical evidence at the individual level to support the assumptions put 
forth by the theory. Because peripheral, or as I have labeled them, sporadic voters are 
influenced to participate by short-term forces such as increased party mobilization and 
media coverage in high profile elections and because most midterm elections are low  
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Figure 2.1 General Election Turnout 1980-2004 
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profile, we would expect sporadic voters to make up the majority of those individuals 
that abstain in midterm elections.  
I argue in the previous section that sporadic voters are influenced to participate in 
presidential elections by changes in their attitudes from one election to the next.  If 
attitude change drives their behavior in presidential elections I would also contend that 
the same factors will explain their decision to participate in midterm elections. Also, as 
argued earlier, habitual voters and nonvoters are not expected to be influenced by 
attitude change. Therefore, we would not expect attitude change to influence habitual 
voter and habitual nonvoter behavior in midterm elections.  
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H3: Sporadic voters with “positive” attitude changes from one election to the 
next are more likely to vote than sporadic voters with no or negative changes.  
 
H4: Attitude changes from one election to the next will have no influence on 
habitual voter and nonvoter behavior. 
 
Elite Mobilization and Political Attitudes 
Politicians and academics alike have expressed concern about the low levels of political 
participation in the United States and how participation disparities can lead to inequality.  
As Lijphart (1997, 1) points out, “unequal participation spells unequal influence….”  
Yet, such assertions are not new to our discourse.  In the late 1940s V.O. Key posited, 
“The blunt truth is that politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much 
heed to classes and groups of citizens that do not vote” (Key 1949, 527).    
Because of such concerns in recent years both federal and state legislators have 
enacted electoral reforms with a goal to increase overall participation rates.  These 
reforms have attempted to lower what political scholars have described as the costs 
associated with participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995).  The most current evidence of this at the federal level is the National Voter 
Registration Act (Motor Voter), which President Clinton signed into law on May 20, 
1993.   
While this legislation had a number of provisions, the core of the law made it 
easier for individuals to register for elections by requiring that all states offer citizens the 
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opportunity to register when renewing or acquiring a driver’s license or picture 
identification.  It also required that state aid offices such as AFDC, WIC and the VA 
provide clients with registration opportunities and to assist them in properly filling out 
forms (PL 103-31, 1993).  By making registration easier, policy makers were heeding 
the advice of academics whose research had suggested that lowering the costs of 
registration would increase voter turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; 
Teixeira 1992).  
Some states have taken their own measures to lower the costs of voting. In 1991 
Texas became the first of 15 states to establish mandatory early voting (Hansen 2001).  
Early voting attempts to lower the cost of participation by allowing citizens to cast their 
ballots up to three weeks prior to Election Day at numerous satellite polling stations in 
their community.  These polling stations can be at more traditional locations, like the 
county courthouse or more public friendly locations such as shopping malls or grocery 
stores.      
 A second trend among some states has been to liberalize restrictions on absentee 
voting.  In the last fifteen years, 22 states have begun to allow all their citizens to request 
an absentee ballot without a need to prove cause (Hansen 2001).  In 1995 Oregon took 
absentee voting to new heights by implementing voting by mail in statewide elections.  
This was first attempted in primary elections where all registered voters were mailed a 
ballot, which could be either mailed in or dropped off at local polling stations if they 
wanted to save the cost of a stamp.  This new policy was so popular among Oregonians 
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that in 1998 they approved an initiative that would establish vote by mail in all statewide 
elections (Berinsky, Burns and Traugott 2001).   
While the costs associated with voting have been dramatically lowered for a 
large number of Americans, research has found that it has had little to effect on 
participation levels (Berinsky, Burns and Traugott 2001;Erikson 1981; Knack 1995; 
Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997; Rhine 1995).  Because lowering voting costs has proven 
to be ineffective, perhaps we should turn our attention to potential alternative ways of 
increasing turnout.  If attitude change can bring large numbers of individuals into the 
voting pool, I contend that identifying factors that could change attitudes will lead us 
closer to understanding effective ways of increasing turnout.     
 In their extensive study of turnout trends over a 36 year period, Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) conclude that variations in mobilization efforts of elites explain over 50% 
of the decrease in voter turnout witnessed since 1960. They argue that variations in 
mobilization efforts were caused by changes in campaign strategies by candidates and 
parties, fewer competitive elections, contested presidential primaries, and the decline of 
social movement activity (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 218).   
 Though our understanding of the importance of elite mobilization is quite clear, 
how mobilization produces this effect is a much cloudier picture.  The most prominent 
explanation is that mobilization increases turnout because it lowers the cost of voting by 
providing information about registration, voting locations, and absentee ballots or 
providing travel to and from the polling palace (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Leighley 
2001).   
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 On the other hand, as Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) acknowledge: 
Contact with party workers perhaps, reshapes people’s perception and changes 
people’s attitudes about the parties, the candidates, the election and the efficacy 
of political action (174).7 
 
What if mobilization does more than lower the cost of voting?  As discussed earlier, 
turnout can be explained by more than simply skill and resource levels.  Individuals 
often respond to changes in the political environment (Beck and Jennings 1979; 
Campbell et al. 1960; Hill and Leighley 1993).  They are also influenced by their 
attitudes toward the offered alternatives in any given election (Brody 1979; Bordy and 
Page 1973; Zipp 1985). 
 If the political environment and attitudes about that environment influence an 
individual’s decision to participate in politics, then mobilization may also influence 
individual perceptions.  Contact from candidates and parties may reaffirm party and 
group attachments (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Uhlaner 1989).  By providing voters with 
information about party and candidate issue positions, mobilization may allow 
individuals to better differentiate between the options available.  In other words, 
mobilization may influence such attitudes as low political efficacy, indifference and 
alienation. If so, we have the following testable hypothesis: 
                                                 
7
 Though they acknowledge mobilization could have such an impact on individuals, Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) suggest that their findings only marginally support such claims.  However, these findings 
are relegated to a footnote and not reported in any extensive manner (see footnote 17, p. 174).   
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H5: Individuals who have been contacted by either the candidates or parties will 
display greater feelings of political efficacy and will be less likely to have feeling 
of indifference and alienation. 
 
 If the above hypothesis is correct, elite mobilization could increase turnout if 
elites focused their efforts on sporadic voters.  As I have argued earlier, sporadic voters 
are individuals for whom attitude change matters in their decision to participate in any 
given election. Unfortunately, as also noted earlier, political elites strategically target 
mobilization efforts, primarily focusing effort on partisans who have shown a propensity 
to vote in the past (i.e. habitual voters).  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have introduced the concept of the sporadic voter. I have demonstrated 
how socioeconomic and habitual voting theories of political participation cannot explain 
the behavior of sporadic voters.  I argue that a more appropriate theory is one that takes 
into consideration attitude change from one election to the next. Such a theory will lead 
to a greater understanding of why we observe significant fluctuations across presidential 
elections and why we observe large drops in turnout during midterm elections.  
 Finally, under the umbrella of understanding political participation and the role 
attitudes play in determining voter turnout I ague that we should turn our attention to 
elite mobilization. By turning our attention to factors that can shape political attitudes we 
can begin to develop more accurate models of the factors that, if changed, would result 
in greater levels of political participation. 
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CHAPTER III 
SPORADIC VOTERS: EXPLAINING CHANGES IN VOTER TURNOUT 
As noted in Chapter II, one of the dominant topics in the behavior literature revolves 
around the question of voter turnout and the factors that explain why some individuals 
choose to cast a ballot and others do not. Studies on voter turnout tend to emphasize the 
legal context, individual attributes, and attitudes related to the political environment..  
The most popular approach over the last 20 years has stressed the important role 
socioeconomic status (SES) plays in explaining political participation (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Better educated and more 
wealthy individuals are expected to be better equipped to participate in politics and are 
more likely to be mobilized by others.    
Recent research in this area has attempted to move in a new direction by 
recasting political participation as a habit-forming endeavor (Green and Shachar 2000; 
Plutzer 2002; Gerber, Green and Schachar, 2003).  These authors argue that regardless 
of the legal barriers and individual attributes, a large number of citizens eventually move 
from being habitual nonvoters to habitual voters.  In the habitual framework, SES may 
explain how fast one will move from being a nonvoter to a voter; however, SES has little 
influence on why individuals continue to participate in subsequent elections (Plutzer 
2002).   
 Yet, the habitual voting framework is inconsistent with established voting 
patterns. As the figure in the previous chapter demonstrates, turnout in presidential 
elections over the last 44 years has fluctuated greatly. This pattern is more consistent 
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with Campbell’s (1960) argument that among all eligible voters, there are a significant 
number of peripheral voters who will only cast a ballot in high stimulus elections.  
A second established pattern in the literature, inconsistent with the habitual 
voting framework, is the surge and decline in turnout observed between presidential and 
congressional elections (Bron 1990; Campbell 1987; 1991; 1997; Cover 1985; DeNardo 
1980).  If voting is a habit, why do millions of Americans vote in presidential elections 
and abstain in congressional elections (see Figure 2.1 in previous chapter).    
In this chapter, I address the first inconsistent pattern, why we observe 
fluctuations in voter turnout from one presidential election to the next. I challenge the 
habitual voter framework in that I argue a significant number of Americans are better 
classified as “sporadic voters.”  Sporadic voters differ from their habitual counterparts 
because such factors as their attitudes toward the political parties and their interest in the 
campaign will determine if they participate in any given election.  Using NES panel 
data, I present evidence that sporadic voters are influenced by political attitude changes 
such as partisan strength, external efficacy and campaign interest from one election to 
the next.  The evidence suggests that sporadic voters will change their behavior, if 
between elections their attitudes change. My findings also support the argument that the 
influence of attitude change on sporadic voters’ behavior differentiates them from 
individuals classified as habitual voters and habitual nonvoters in that change in attitudes 
has no influence on the political behavior of the latter.   
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Voting as a Habit: Recent Theoretical Advances 
Plutzer (2002) argues that the individual factors suggested by earlier authors attempting 
to explain political participation are incomplete. Using panel data, Plutzer takes a closer 
look at the factors that influence the probability of voting over time. He tracks 
respondents’ voting patterns in the 1968, 1972, 1976 and 1980 elections. Using a latent 
growth curve model which as Plutzer (2002) explains: 
Each respondent’s first eligible election is coded as ELECTION -0, so the 
intercept, 0, indicates the individual’s starting level and the slope 1, estimates 
the growth in the latent probability of voting – hence, the characterization of a 
“latent growth curve (45). 
Plutzer argues that voting can best be understood through a developmental 
framework.  In this framework, traditional measures of social background and SES 
explain when an individual will likely enter the voting population followed by a second 
set of forces that keep a voter repeating the behavior. 
 These second set of forces is very vague. Plutzer (2002) posits that perhaps by 
aging most individuals “outgrow” nonvoting, or life events such as marriage or home 
ownership play a role. Plutzer writes: “Unfortunately, the nature of inertia is 
undertheorized. …I only offer some speculation, the specifics of which will remain for 
future research to fill in” (2002, 43). 
Plutzer (2002) finds that individual factors such as education and income explain 
when habitual nonvoters will become habitual voters; however, he argues such factors 
tell us little about why voters continue to vote. In fact, characteristics such as education, 
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political knowledge, and income become less important as individuals advance in age. 
For example, among those who were first eligible to vote in 1968, college graduates had 
around a .58 probability of voting, while those that had never attended college had about 
a .41 probability of casting a ballot. By 1980, not only had all respondents in the cohort 
become much more likely to vote, the gap had narrowed significantly, with college 
graduates having a .90 probability of voting and those with no college having a .85 
probability (Plutzer 2002, 52). Because all respondents were more likely to vote, the 
relative impact of education was substantially reduced.  He also finds that once an 
individual decides to vote for the first time, she usually moves from being a habitual 
nonvoter to a habitual voter.   
As Plutzer recognizes, the data set he uses has two potentially serious flaws.  
First, the cohort under examination came of age during one of the most politically 
volatile periods in this country’s history.  Events like the war in Vietnam and the civil 
rights movement may have shaped the cohort’s political behavior in a way as to make 
them distinct from subsequent cohorts.  The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study 
(Jennings, Markus and Niemi 1991) surveyed both high school students and their parents 
in 1965, and in two more waves late in 1973 and 1982. The surveys consisted of 
questions related to political participation, group evaluations, civic orientations and 
partisanship.   
Second, those conducting the survey dropped respondents who did not complete 
high school, which resulted in 27 percent of the initial cohort being excluded from the 
study.  Considering the likely social and racial make-up of those dropped from the study, 
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it limits our ability to generalize the results reported by Plutzer (2002) to the American 
electorate. Research has found that most high school dropouts come from low income 
and minority populations (Meier, Stewart and Stewart 1989). Because dropout rates are 
so skewed, the 73% from the initial 1965 survey that participated in the other two waves 
of the study are likely from white, wealthier and better educated families.  
 I argue that the habitual voter framework overlooks a significant number of 
citizens. For example, of the individuals that participated in the National Election Study 
(NES) 1972-1976 and 1990-1992 panel studies, over 20% exhibited behavior 
inconsistent with the habitual voting framework.  Some voted in 1968 but did not cast a 
ballot in 1972 and 1976.  Others voted in 1988 and 1990 but failed to vote in 1992.   
These numbers are interesting because the habitual voting framework cannot 
explain why over 20% of former voters do not cast a ballot in subsequent elections.  
Once a person has transitioned from being a nonvoter to a voter, she should continue to 
repeat the behavior.  Yet, when such a large number of former voters do not vote they 
have either not acquired a habit or forces outside of their control have prevented them 
from casting a ballot (e.g. illness, family emergency).  If the former is true, a theory to 
explain a population that I term sporadic voters adds to our understanding of why some 
citizens choose to participate in politics and why that number fluctuates from election to 
election.  If the latter were true, any effort to distinguish sporadic voters from the general 
population would fail.    
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The Sporadic Voter 
Elections do not occur in a vacuum.  Citizens are exposed to media coverage, 
conversations with friends and family and the mobilization efforts of political parties.  
This exposure shapes their attitudes about themselves and their place within the political 
sphere, which can also change from election to election.  Individuals move. They get 
promotions and lose their jobs. The parties change candidates and issues.   All of these 
changes could lead to changes in one’s attitudes toward his or her political environment 
and the environment’s orientation to the individual. Also, scholars have noted that what 
determines who will vote can vary across elections (Jennings and Markus 1988). If the 
factors that determine voting change over time it would suggest that individual attitudes 
are changing over time as well.  
A number of scholars have pointed to attitudinal or contextual factors that 
influence individual behavior.  At one time, the role of attitudes in explaining behavior 
was prominent in the literature.  Though opinions differed as to the effectiveness of such 
measures, most find that individuals possessing low levels of internal and external 
efficacy were less likely to participate in politics (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; 
Ashenfelter and Kelly 1975; Cassel and Hill 1981; Citrin 1974; Craig 1979; Shaffer 
1981).    
 A second and often overlooked area of the attitudes literature focuses on 
individuals’ perceptions of the options available in any given election.  Campbell et al. 
(1960) found that turnout increased with the perceived attractiveness of alternatives 
between the parties in any given election.   Similarly, Reiter (1979) suggested that 
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perhaps one reason lower-status whites participate less in elections is the lack of a viable 
socialist party on the ballot. Such suggestions are supported by findings that lower-class 
Canadians were more likely to vote when the “mildly socialist party” was running a 
candidate in their district (Zipp and Smith 1982).  We also know that political 
participation by both young and old can be explained by the issue stances taken by 
political leaders (Beck and Jennings 1979).  Others have found that as the ideological 
differences between political parties within a state increased, participation within that 
state also increased (Hill and Leighley 1993).   
 Another example is Brody (1978), who suggests the importance alienation and 
indifference can play in an individual’s decision to participate.  Alienation describes how 
negatively or positively an individual feels toward offered alternatives.  If the individual 
has a negative attitude toward the parties and candidates in any given election, then she 
is considered alienated and, therefore, less likely to participate.   
Indifference describes the amount of contrast the individual perceives in the 
political environment.  This differs from alienation in that the attitudes need not be 
negative.  A citizen can hold positive evaluations of all viable parties and candidates.  If 
the evaluations are so close that the individual sees no difference between the candidates 
or parties, the individual is indifferent as to the outcome of the election, making him or 
her less likely to cast a ballot.  
 Although most recent studies of individual turnout have ignored attitudes of 
alienation and indifference, earlier studies suggest that the inclusion of such measures 
could be beneficial.  Brody and Page’s (1973) study of the 1968 presidential election 
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found that respondents who summarized both candidates and parties negatively (i.e. 
were alienated) were less likely to cast a ballot.  They also found that those respondents 
who evaluated both candidates and parties the same (i.e. were indifferent) were also less 
likely to participate. Zipp (1885) later found stronger evidence that indifference and 
alienation can influence participation rates.  
 Though we have ample evidence that attitudes do influence one’s decision to 
participate in the political process, previous studies have been limited to cross-sectional 
studies of single or multiple elections. Such studies are limited in their ability to explain 
how attitudes influence behavior and if variation in attitudes over time will result in 
behavioral changes. Also, earlier cross-sectional studies did not address the potential 
problem of endogeneity (see, Finkel 1985, 1987; Junn 1991; Leighley 1991; Madsen 
1987 and Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).  Ignoring the chance the there is a 
reciprocal relationship between one’s attitudes and the act of political participation can 
result in an inflation of the direct impact of attitudes on political participation.  
The habitual voting framework minimizes (or ignores entirely) the influence of 
factors such as changes in political context and attitudes on one’s decision to participate.  
However, as earlier research suggests, a significant number of individuals do not display 
habitual voting behavior (Campbell 1960: 1964; Sigelman et al. 1985).  It is among these 
sporadic voters that I argue, we should expect to find changes in attitudes from one 
election to the next influencing one’s decision to cast a ballot. Consequently, I propose 
two testable hypotheses:   
H1:  Changes in attitudes between elections will influence the likelihood a 
sporadic voter will cast a ballot.   
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H2: Changes in attitudes between elections will not influence the likelihood a 
habitual voter or habitual nonvoter will cast a ballot.    
 
Identifying Sporadic Voters 
To test these hypotheses, I had to first develop a way of identifying conceptually citizens 
on the basis of the reported voting behavior.  Following Plutzer (2002), a habitual voter 
would be one who, after deciding to vote, continues the behavior in subsequent 
elections, while nonvoters are those citizens who choose to abstain from voting in all 
elections.  Sporadic voters, on the other hand, would be those individuals who choose to 
vote in some elections but abstain in others.  
Identifying these three types of voters requires panel data.  Panel data contain 
interviews of the same individuals over a series of elections. This is important for two 
reasons, first it allows for the documentation of reported behavior over a series of 
elections. Second, it also allows for measurement of individual characteristics such as 
economic situations and political attitudes in different electoral contexts. 
The National Election Study 1972-1976 and 1990-1992 panel studies allow for 
respondents to be placed in one of the three categories above.8  The 1972-1976 NES 
panel study consisted of three waves. Pre election and post election surveys were 
conducted in 1972, 1974 and 1976. Of the 2100 interviews conducted in 1972, 1495 
                                                 
8
 The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 
Center for Political Studies.  The NES is supported by the National Science Foundation, under grant 
numbers SBR-9707741, SBR-9317631, SES-9209410, SES-9009379, SES-8808361, SES-8341310, SES-
8207580, and SOC77-08885, as well as the Russell Sage Foundation under grant number 82-00-01, and 
the University of Michigan. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this 
dissertation are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the funding agencies. 
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respondents participated in all three waves of the study. The 1990-1992 NES panel study 
consisted of three waves. Pre and post election surveys were conducted in 1990 and 
1992. Of the 1991 interviews conducted in 1990, 1359 respondents participated in both 
waves of the study. Utilizing two panel studies improves the reliability of any findings 
because it replicates the study with two separate populations about 20 years apart.   
Respondents were asked if they had voted in the current election and if they had 
voted in the previous election. Those individuals who reported voting in the 1968 and 
1972 elections from the 72-76 panel were classified as habitual voters. Respondents who 
reported voting in 1968 but not voting in 1972 were classified as sporadic voters and 
those who abstained in 1968 and 1972 were classified as nonvoters.  
 
Table 3.1 Types of Voters in the 1972-1976 Panel Study 
 
Habitual Voters 
(Voted in 1968 and 1972) 
Sporadic Voters 
(Voted in 1968 or 1972) 
Nonvoters 
(Abstained in 1968 and 
1972) 
782 Respondents 
(64%) 
307 Respondents  
(26%) 
127 Respondents 
(10%) 
Source: 1972-1776 NES Panel Study. 
 
 
In Table 3.1 we see that 64 percent of the respondents reported voting in both the 
1968 and 1972 elections and 10 percent reported abstaining in both elections. However, 
a significant number, 26% reported voting in one of the elections and abstaining in the 
other.  
The same coding scheme was used for the 1990-1992 panel study.  Those who 
reported voting in the 1988 and 1992 election were classified as habitual voters. 
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Nonvoters are those individuals who reported not voting in any of the elections under 
study. Respondents who reported only voting in 1988 or 1990 were categorized as 
sporadic voters.  
Table 3.2 displays the number of respondents that fell into each category for the 
1990-1992 panel study. Like Table 3.1, the largest category is that of habitual voter, with 
50 percent of the respondents voting in both elections. Yet, again we see a significant 
number of respondents, 20 percent, falling into the category of sporadic voters. 
 
Table 3.2 Types of Voters in the 1990-1992 Panel Study 
 
Habitual Voters 
(Voted in 1988 and 1990) 
Sporadic Voters 
(Voted in 1988 or 1990) 
Nonvoters 
(Abstained in 1988 and 
1990) 
552 Respondents 
(50%) 
217 Respondents  
(20%) 
332 Respondents 
(30%) 
 
One clear difference is the 20 percent increase in nonvoters. The election of 1988 had 
one of the lowest levels of voter turnout in the past 40 years (see Figure 1.1). With 
historically low presidential voter turnout, coupled with the expected drop in turnout for 
off year elections (see Bron 1990; Campbell 1987; 1991; 1997; Cover 1985; DeNardo 
1980), it is not unexpected that we would see a large number of nonvoters in this time 
series. 
 The results in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are initial evidence that the habitual voter 
framework (Plutzer 2002) may be an oversimplification of the electoral process. I have 
identified a sizeable portion of the American electorate that does not fit neatly into the 
habitual or nonvoter categories. These individuals have chosen to participate in one 
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election, but in the following election chose to stay home. Suggesting that a habit had 
been acquired is thus dubious. 
 If sporadic voters have not acquired a habit, what explains why the chose to vote 
in some election and abstain in other?  A discussed in the earlier, I contend that changing 
attitudes over time will explain this behavior. Electoral environments change from one 
election to the next which I posit can strengthen or weaken partisan attachment, 
campaign interest and other attitudes like political efficacy and alienation. The decision 
to cast a ballot for a sporadic voter will depend on there attitude levels at the time of the 
election.      
 
Developing Measures  
Any model of political participation must account for resource based factors that 
previous scholars identified to play a significant role in predicting voter turnout 
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Education and 
income are argued to be important measures that represent the skill levels individuals 
bring to the political arena. I measure education on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 representing 
individuals with less than a eighth grade education and 10 being those who hold 
advanced degrees. Income is measured on a scale from 1 to 19. Respondents reporting 
no family income were coded 1, and those who reported family incomes over 35,000 
were coded 19 (over 90,000 in the 1990-1992 NES Panel).  
 Age is another important factor often identified to influence skill levels 
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Verba, Schlozman). As individuals age they have 
  49 
 
more opportunities to interact with governmental agencies. Such interaction allows them 
to develop the skills necessary to participate in a democratic society. To account for the 
influence of age on voter turnout, I include a measure of the respondent’s age in the 
analysis.  
 The attitudes recognized earlier in the study of political behavior to influence the 
likelihood of voting were partisan strength, campaign interest and one’s feeling about the 
importance of voting (Campball et al. 1960).  Partisan strength is measured as the folded 
seven-point party identification scale. The scale ranges from independents coded 0 
through strong partisans coded 3. The campaign interest measure ranges from 0 to 2 with 
0 being those individuals who responded she had no interest in the upcoming campaign 
and 2 are those who were very interested. The importance of voting measure also ranges 
from 0 to 2. Respondents who reported she thought voting was not important were coded 
0 and those who stated voting was very important were coded 2.9 
Political efficacy has long been an important concept in the study of political 
participation (Fraser, 1970; Hawkins, Marando, & Taylor, 1971; Langton & Karns, 
1969; White, 1968). Most scholars agree that political efficacy is best conceptualized as 
two components internal and external efficacy (Balch, 1974; Converse, 1972; Craig, 
1979; Craig & Maggiotto, 1982; Morrell, 2003; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991).  Internal 
refers to a citizen’s feelings of effectiveness in dealing with government. Does she fell 
she is smart enough and understands politics well enough to participate. External 
efficacy refers to a citizen’s feelings that government cares about her problems.   
                                                 
9
 The voting importance question was not included in the 1990-192 panel study, therefore the measure is 
omitted from the analysis of those years.  
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  I measure external efficacy on a scale with an agree/disagree response to three 
questions: (1) “I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think,” (2) 
“Generally speaking, those we elect to Congress lose touch with the people pretty 
quickly,” (3) “Parties are interested only in people’s votes, not their opinions” (1972, 
Cronbach’s  = .79; 1976 Cronbach’s  = .76; 1990, Cronbach’s  = .80; 1992, 
Cronbach’s  = .84).10 This scale runs from 0 to 3, with those scoring 0 representing the 
lowest level of external efficacy and 3 representing those with the highest.  
 Internal efficacy was not included for both measurement and theoretical reasons. 
The traditional questions the used to measure internal efficacy are: (1) “Is voting the 
only way people like you have a say,” (2) “Is politics to complicated for you to 
understand,” (3) “Do people like you have any say in what the government does?” These 
questions scale poorly (1972 Cronbach’s  = .51; 1976 Cronbach’s  = .53).  More 
importantly, internal efficacy has been found to be fairly stable over time (Clarke and 
Acock 1989). On the other hand, external efficacy has been found to respond to changes 
in the political environment (Clarke and Acock, 1989; Gurin and Brim, 1984). 
Like Zipp (1985), I used party thermometer scales to create measures of 
indifference and alienation. Respondents were asked to place the Democrat (pdD) and 
Republican (pdR) parties on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 with 0 being coldest and 100 
being warmest.11  To construct a measure of party alienation, I added the Democratic 
party’s position on the thermometer scale to that of the Republican party and then 
                                                 
10
 Cronbach’s  score are for the three questions used to measure external and internal efficacy for each 
year of the panels.   
11
 The appendix contains a discussion about using thermometer scales in survey data analysis.  
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reversed the scoring ((200- (pdD + pdR)). The resulting measure ranges from 0-200 
where a score of 200 represents those respondents who gave both parties a score 0 and 
are, therefore, extremely alienated from both parties.  To create a measure of party 
indifference, I took the absolute value of the difference between the Democrat party 
thermometer score (pdD) and that of the Republican party (pdR) and reversed the 
scoring ((100 – abs(pdD - pdR ) ). As a respondent’s score moves closer to 100, the less 
of a difference she perceived between the two parties. 
Respondents were also asked to place the Democrat candidate (pdDC) and 
Republican Candidate (pdRC) on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.  To construct a measure 
of candidate alienation, I added the Democratic candidate’s position to that of the 
Republican candidate and then reversed the scoring ((200- (pdDC + pdRC)). The 
resulting measure ranges from 0-200 where a score of 200 represents those respondents 
who gave both candidates a score 0 and are, therefore, extremely alienated from both 
candidates.  To create a measure of candidate indifference I took the absolute value of 
the difference between the Democrat candidate thermometer score (pdDC) and that of 
the Republican candidate (pdRC) and reversed the scoring ((100 – abs(pdDC - pdRC ) ). 
As a respondent’s score moves closer to 100, the less of a difference she perceived 
between the two parties. 
 
Methods and Results 
The heart of my argument is that sporadic voters differ from habitual and nonvoters. For 
an initial test of this argument, I compare the mean values of the independent variables 
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in the two panels. In Table 3.3 I report the mean values for the 1972-1976 panel, and in 
Table 3.4 I report the mean values for the 1990-1992 panel. 
 
Table 3.3  Mean Values on Independent Variables for Respondents in the 1972-
1976 NES Panel  
 
Variables 
(Range) 
Habitual 
Voters 
Sporadic 
Voters 
Non-Voters 
Party ID Strength (0-3) 1.88 1.66* 1.39 
Education (1-10) 6.2 5.27* 4.04 
Income (1-19) 12.30 10.27* 8.03 
Age (18-89) 46.6 44.34 44.65 
Campaign Interest (0-2) 1.34 1.07* .76 
Importance of Voting (0-2) 1.94 1.77* 1.38 
External Efficacy (0-3) 1.42 1.03* .58 
Candidate Indifference (0-100) 70.10 71.33 71.14 
Party Indifference (0-100) 82.74 83.96* 85.02 
Candidate Alienation  (0-200) 75.55 74.73 74.23 
Party Alienation  (0-100) 74.16 78.91* 75.76 
N 782 307 127 
P <.05 Source: 1972-1976 NES Panel Study. 
 
Looking at Table 3.3, we see that sporadic voters differ significantly from habitual 
voters and habitual nonvoters on almost every independent variable.  For all but three of 
the independent variables, the difference in means between sporadic voters and the other 
categories is statistically significant. Only the measures of age, candidate indifference 
and candidate alienation were sporadic voters not distinguishable from habitual and 
nonvoters.   
 In Table 3.4 we find similar results to those in Table 3.3. For all but four of the 
measures, the mean value of sporadic voters differs significantly from habitual and  
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Table 3.4  Mean Values on Independent Variables for Respondents in the 1990-
1992 NES Panel  
 
Variables 
(Range) 
Habitual 
Voters 
Sporadic 
Voters 
Non-Voters 
Party ID Strength (0-3) 1.75 1.61* 1.31 
Education (1-10) 7.2 6.63 5.13 
Income (1-19) 12.33 11.47* 8.42 
Age (18-89) 45.2 44.56 44.2 
Campaign Interest (0-2) 1.55 1.13* .81 
External Efficacy (0-3) 1.37 1.11* .70 
Candidate Indifference (0-100) 71.88 71.72 70.58 
Party Indifference (0-100) 81.19 83.30* 85.11 
Candidate Alienation  (0-100) 75.55 74.73 74.23 
Party Alienation  (0-100) 71.32 77.71* 72.36 
N 552 217 332 
* P <.05 Source: 1990-1992 NES Panel Study. 
 
 nonvoters. These results suggest that sporadic voters are not merely habitual voters who, 
for random reasons, could not vote in the given election. 
 Had this been the case, we would have observed little to no difference between 
the two groups in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.  Instead for most of the independent variables, it 
appears that sporadic voters are unique. Had sporadic voters actually been habitual 
voters that for some reason could not make it to the polls on election day, we would 
expect their mean values on the independent variables to be similar to that of habitual 
voters. Yet in both panels studies sporadic voters mean values on the independent 
variables are statistically different.  Though sporadic voters seem to have statistically 
different responses to the survey questions under study, this is only the first step in 
determining if these observed differences result in variations in behavior.  
 One of my key hypotheses is that sporadic voters are influenced by changes in 
their attitudes from one election to the next. This would mean that if their attitudes 
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change I would expect to see a change in their behavior. For example, if a sporadic voter 
increased in her level of partisan attachment between the 1972 and 1976 election I would 
expect her to be more likely to cast a ballot in 1976. On the other hand, if there is a 
decrease in her level of partisan attachment I would expect her to abstain.   To test for 
this, I computed the change in independent variable values for the elections under study. 
For the 1972-1976 panels I subtracted the values on the independent variables for the 
1972 survey from those of the 1976 survey. For the 1990-1992 panels I subtracted the 
values on the independent variables for the 1990 survey from those of the 1992 survey.  
Next, I compared the mean change for the independent variables for those sporadic 
voters who chose to cast a ballot in 1976 and 1992 to the mean values for those sporadic 
voters who abstained.   
 
Table 3.5  Change in Values of the Independent Variables for Sporadic Voters 
Between 1972 and 1976 
 
Variables 
(Range) 
Sporadic Voters Who  
Voted in 1976  
Sporadic Voters Who 
Did Not Vote in 1976 
Party ID Strength (0-3) .17 -.16* 
Education (1-10) .18 .18 
Income (1-19) 1.53 .63* 
Campaign Interest (0-2) .33 .03* 
Importance of Voting (0-2) .07 -.06* 
External Efficacy (0-3) .07 -.07* 
Party Indifference (0-100) 2.39 .97 
Party Alienation  (0-100) 4.33 9.98* 
N 139 168 
* P <.05 Source: 1972-1976 NES Panel Study. 
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 In Table 3.5 we see that of the 307 sporadic voters in the sample, 139 chose to 
cast a ballot in the 1976 presidential election.12 Those who chose to vote increased in 
partisan strength, income, importance of voting, and external efficacy from 1972 to 
1976.  Those who chose not to vote decreased in partisan strength, the importance of 
voting and external efficacy.  They also had much smaller increases in income, 
campaign interest and a larger increase in party alienation.  For all but three of the 
independent variables, education and party indifference, the difference in attitude change 
is statistically significant.   
 
Table 3.6  Change in Values of the Independent Variables for Sporadic Voters 
Between 1990 and 1992 
 
Variables 
(Range) 
Sporadic Voters Who  
Voted in 1992  
Sporadic Voters Who 
Did Not Vote in 1992 
Party ID Strength (0-3) .17   .01* 
Income (1-19) 1.42  .51* 
Campaign Interest (0-2) .41 -.07* 
External Efficacy (0-3) .14 -.04* 
Party Indifference (0-100) 1.33 1.10 
Party Alienation  (0-100) 3.45 12.15* 
N 135 82 
* P <.05 Source: 1990-1992 NES Panel Study. 
 
 Table 3.6 results are similar to those of Table 3.5. Of the 217 sporadic voters in 
the sample, 135 chose to cast a ballot in the 1992 presidential election. Those who chose 
to vote increased in partisan strength, income, campaign interest and external efficacy 
from 1990 to 1992.   They also had lager increases in income and much smaller 
                                                 
12
 In the bivariate analysis I only include those measures that sporadic voters differed from habitual voters 
and habitual nonvoters in the previous analysis.   
  56 
 
increases in party alienation.  For all but one of the independent variables, party 
indifference, the difference in change is statistically significant.  
 The bivariate analysis in the previous tables gives some preliminary support to 
the hypothesis that sporadic voters’ decisions to participate in elections are influenced by 
changes in their political attitudes from one election to the next. In summary, sporadic 
voters who cast a ballot in 1976 and 1992 had increases in their partisan attachments, 
campaign interest and external efficacy since the last election. Sporadic voters who did 
not cast a ballot in 1976 and 1992 either had decreases in those attitudes or much smaller 
increases.  
 For a more rigorous test of this hypothesis, I use a binary logit model where 
sporadic voters who chose not to vote in 1976 and 1992 are coded 0 and those who voted 
are coded 1.  The independent variables in this model are those variables in Tables 3.5 
and 3.6 that were significant at a bivariate level. 
As we consider Table 3.7, we see that changes in partisan strength, income, 
campaign interest and party alienation were statistically significant predictors of 
sporadic voters choosing to vote or not vote in the 1976 election.  In more substantive 
terms a sporadic voter has a 47% (+/- .03) likelihood of voting in 1976 when all of the 
independent variables are at their mean value.13  A one standard deviation increase in the 
partisan strength from 1972 to 1976 increases the likelihood of voting to 55% (+/- .02) 
with all other variables at their mean.  A one standard deviation increase for income and  
                                                 
13
 Predicted probabilities were estimated using Clarify, developed by Gary King, Michael Tomz and Jason 
Wittenberg (Tomz et al. 1999 and King et al. 2000). The 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.   
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Table 3.7 Logit Coefficients for Sporadic Voters Casting a Ballot in 1976  
 
 1976 Presidential Election 
Constant  .21 (.21) 
Change in Partisan Strength   .30** (.16) 
Change in Income  .07** (03) 
Change in Campaign Interest   .34** (.19) 
Change in Voting Importance .21 (.24) 
Change in External Efficacy   .24 (.19) 
Change in Party Alienation   -.009* (.005) 
Pseudo R2   . .126 
N  307 
Wald Chi2  40.02 
*P < .1, **P<.05 one-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: 1972-1976 NES Panel Study. 
 
campaign interest changes the likelihood of voting to 56% (+/- .04)  and 54% (+/- .03)  
respectively.  A one standard deviation increase in party alienation reduces the 
likelihood of voting to 43% (+/- .02).   
The coefficients in the binary logit model reported in Table 3.8 suggest that 
attitude change also influenced sporadic voters’ likelihood of casting a ballot in the 1992 
election. Like the 1976 election, changes in partisan strength, campaign interest and 
party alienation were all in the expected direction and statistically  significant. When all 
independent variables are held at their mean value a sporadic voter had a 57% (+/- .04) 
likelihood of casting a ballot in 1992.  A standard deviation increase in partisan strength 
change elevates the likelihood of voting to 64% (+/- .02).  A similar deviation change in 
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campaign interest increased the likelihood of voting to 62% (+/- .03). A one standard 
deviation increase in party alienation reduces the likelihood to casting a ballot in 1992 to 
49% (+/- 4). 
 
Table 3.8 Logit Coefficients for Sporadic Voters Casting a Ballot in 1992  
 
 1992 Presidential Election 
Constant    1.12** (.31) 
Change in Partisan Strength    .41** (.12) 
Change in Income .10 (.09) 
Change in Campaign Interest   .21** (.07) 
Change in External Efficacy   .44 (.26) 
Change in Party Alienation   -.022* (.003) 
Pseudo R2   . .133 
N  189 
Wald Chi2  37.29 
*P < .1, **P<.05 one-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 1990-1992 NES Panel Study. 
 
The results reported in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 are important for two reasons.  First, 
they present strong evidence that a significant number of citizens is influenced by 
changes in their perceptions of the political environment and changes in the 
environment’s relationship to them.  Second, standard deviation changes in the 
independent variables not only substantively changed the likelihood of voting in 1976, 
for most cases it moved the likelihood above the 50% threshold.  
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 While the logit models reported above suggest that we can accept the first 
hypothesis (which states that sporadic voters are influenced by changes in their political 
attitudes from one election to the next), the second hypothesis asserts that this type of 
behavior is unique to sporadic voters.  To test this hypothesis, I ran two binary logit 
models for each panel. In both models, I include all panel respondents so that I am no 
longer simply examining individuals classified as sporadic voters.   
In the first model, for the 1976 and 1992 elections, I included all of the change 
variables from Tables 3.7 and 3.8.  In the 1976 model I include measures of respondents 
change in partisan strength, change in income, change in campaign interest, change in 
voting importance, change in external efficacy and change in party alienation. I the 1992 
model I include measure of respondents change in partisan strength, change in income, 
change in campaign interest, change in external efficacy and change in party alienation. 
In the new analysis I added a measure of residential stability. Verba and Nie 
(1972) identified the importance of stability of residence in explaining voter turnout. 
Mobility increases the cost associated with voting. When a person moves, she must 
reregister to vote and determine local polling places. Those who moved between the two 
elections were coded 0 and those who had the same residence were coded 1.   
To compare the behavior of sporadic voters to that of habitual voters and habitual 
nonvoters, I had to run an interactive model for both elections. I interacted a dummy 
variable, representing sporadic voters, with all of the change in attitude measures to run 
the interactive models.  This allowed me to statistically differentiate how these changes 
influenced the sporadic voters’ behavior compared to individuals who voted in the 
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previous two elections (Habitual Voters) and those who did not vote in either election 
(nonvoters).  The dependent variable in both models for each year is coded 1 for those 
respondents who voted in 1976 or 1992 and 0 for those who did not cast a ballot. 
If my second hypothesis is correct, I would expect the results in the first model 
for 1976 and 1992 to look like earlier cross-sectional studies examining attitudes and 
voter turnout (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Ashenfelter and Kelly 1975; Cassel and Hill 
1981; Citrin 1974; Craig 1979; Shaffer 1981).  Similar to those studies, the measure of 
attitude change should be significant predictors of voter turnout. However, in the second 
model when I differentiate sporadic voters, I expect the coefficients on the attitude 
measures to only remain significant for sporadic voters.14   
Looking at the first model in Table 3.9 we see that several of the attitudinal 
measures behave as earlier literature would suggest.  Those individuals who increased in 
their attachment to the parties and their external efficacy from the 1972 election to the 
1976 election were more likely to cast a ballot.  Those respondents whose feeling of 
alienation had increased were, on the other hand, less likely to vote in the 1976 election. 
By interacting a dummy variable representing sporadic voters with all the 
independent variables I am able to compare the influence of the independent variables on 
sporadic voters to that of habitual voter and habitual nonvoters. In the second model of 
Table 3.9 we see considerable differences. The change in attitude measures no longer 
explain the voting behavior of non-sporadic voters, yet when we look at the interaction 
terms, which represent the influence of these variables for sporadic voters, four of the  
                                                 
14
 A discussion of the problem of endogeneity in models of participation and steps taken to reduce its 
likelihood in this dissertation is reported in the appendix.  
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Table 3.9  Logit Coefficients for All Respondents Casting a Ballot in 1976  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant   1.7** (.11) 
  1.7** 
(.12) 
Change in Partisan Strength   .17** (.09) 
-.002 
(.11) 
Change in Income    .04** (.02) 
  .04* 
(02) 
Change in Campaign Interest .07 (.10) 
.12 
(.13) 
Change in Voting Importance -.06 (.17) 
-.11 
(.30) 
Change in External Efficacy   .14* (.10) 
.02 
(.11) 
Change in Party Alienation   -.005** (.002) 
-.004 
(.006) 
Moved     -1.03** (.16) 
  -1.05** 
(.19) 
Sporadic * Change in 
Partisan Strength  _ 
    .60** 
 (.21) 
Sporadic * Change in Income _  -.006 (.05) 
Sporadic * Change in 
Campaign Interest  _ 
-.21 
(.25) 
Sporadic * Change in Voting 
Importance _ 
 .27 
(.36) 
Sporadic * Change in 
External Efficacy   _ 
 .47** 
(.24) 
Sporadic * Change in Party 
Alienation   _ 
-.006** 
(.003) 
Sporadic * Moved _ .04 (.28) 
Pseudo R2 
.056 .061 
N 1007 1007 
Wald Chi2 51.38 63.66 
*P < .1, **P<.05 one-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 1972-1976 NES Panel Study. 
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five are statistically significant and in the expected direction. .  The sum of the change in 
partisan strength and the change in partisan strength * sporadic- change in partisan 
strength is significantly different than zero value = 6.75 ~ 2, with one degree of 
freedom; p <0.05. The sum of the change in external efficacy and the change in external 
efficacy * sporadic- change in external efficacy is significantly different than zero value 
= 3.08 ~ 2, with one degree of freedom; p <0.1. The sum of the change in party 
alienation and the change in party alienation * sporadic- change in party alienation is 
significantly different than zero value = 11.39 ~ 2, with one degree of freedom; p <0.05. 
Such results lend strong support to the second hypothesis.  Changes in attitudes from one 
election to the next do influence the behavior of sporadic voters; however, they do not 
explain why non-sporadic voters choose to vote or abstain from one election to the next. 
Looking at the first model in Table 3.10, we see that increasing family income 
from 1990 to 1992 had a positive and statistically significant relationship, with the 
likelihood a respondent chose to cast a ballot in 1992.  In the same model, increases in 
party alienation and moving between the two elections had a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with the likelihood a respondent chose to cast a ballot in 1992. 
 In Model 2 of Table 7, we see the same pattern in the 1992 data that we observed 
in the 1976 data reported in Table 5.  Once sporadic voters are differentiated from 
habitual and nonvoters, three of the four change in attitude measures become significant 
and are in the expected direction.  Changes in one’s attitudes from 1990 to 1992 about 
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the political parties and the campaigns influenced the likelihood that a sporadic voter 
would cast a ballot but had no significant influence on habitual or nonvoters.  
 Looking at the first model in Table 3.10, we see that increasing partisan strength, 
external efficacy and family income from 1990 to 1992 have positive and statistically 
significant effects on the likelihood a respondent chose to cast a ballot in 1992.  In the 
same model, increasing in party alienation and moving between the two elections had a 
negative and statistically significant relationship with the likelihood a respondent chose 
to cast a ballot in 1992. 
In Model 2 of Table 3.10, we see the same pattern in the 1992 data we observed 
in the 1976 data reported in Table 3.9.  Once sporadic voters are differentiated from 
other citizens, changes in partisan strength, external efficacy and party alienation are no 
longer significant for non-sporadic voters. Yet, the same measures of attitude change 
remain in the expected direction and remain statistically significant. . The sum of the 
change in partisan strength and the change in partisan strength * sporadic- change in 
partisan strength is significantly different than zero value = 3.23 ~ 2, with one degree of 
freedom; p <0.1. The sum of the change in campaign interest and the change in 
campaign interest * sporadic- change in campaign interest is significantly different than 
zero value = 2.87 ~ 2, with one degree of freedom; p <0.1. The sum of the change in 
party alienation and the change in party alienation * sporadic- change in party alienation 
is significantly different than zero value = 4.52~ 2, with one degree of freedom; p 
<0.05. 
   
  64 
 
 
 
Table 3.10  Logit Coefficients for All Respondents Casting a Ballot in 1992  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant   1.5** (.12) 
  1.4** 
(.11) 
Change in Partisan Strength  .05 (.09) 
-.02 
(.10) 
Change in Income    .04** (.02) 
 .02 
(.02) 
Change in Campaign Interest .02 (.10) 
-.08 
(.02) 
Change in External Efficacy   .03 (.04) 
.03 
(.04) 
Change in Party Alienation   -.005** (.002) 
-.004 
(.003) 
Moved    -.61** (.16) 
  -.81** 
(.20) 
Sporadic * Change in 
Partisan Strength  _ 
    .43** 
 (.25) 
Sporadic * Change in Income _  .05 (.06) 
Sporadic * Change in 
Campaign Interest  _ 
  .52** 
(.27) 
Sporadic * Change in 
External Efficacy   _ 
 .02 
(.09) 
Sporadic * Change in Party 
Alienation   _ 
-.01* 
(.007) 
Sporadic * Moved _   .53 
 (.45) 
Pseudo R2 .023 .037 
N 969 969 
Wald Chi2 24.03 36.79 
*P < .1, **P<.05 one-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 1990-1992 NES Panel Study. 
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The results in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 lend strong support to my second hypothesis, 
that the influence of attitude change on political behavior is unique to sporadic voters. A 
second and unexpected result is how the influence of residential stability differed for 
sporadic voters when compared to the other respondents. In the first model of Tables 3.9 
and 3.10 the coefficients for those who moved is negative and significant, which is what 
previous research would suggest (Verba and Nie 1972).     
In the second model of both tables the effect of moving remains negative and 
significant for habitual voters and habitual nonvoters. Yet, the coefficient for sporadic 
voters is not only insignificant, it is in the opposite direction. This finding suggests that 
sporadic voters are willing to overcome the increased cost associated with moving (ie. 
reregistering and liking the polling location) because they are motivated to vote. 
Habitual voters and habitual nonvoters appear to lack the motivation to take the steps 
need to vote soon after a move.  
  
Conclusion 
The results in this chapter merit attention for three reasons.  First, I find evidence that 
supports the habitual voting framework for a large number of Americans.  A majority of 
the respondents who voted in 1968 and 1988 continued to vote in the subsequent 
elections.  They also continued to display this behavior regardless of changes from one 
election cycle to the next.  In fact, as in Plutzer’s (2002) work I find many of the factors 
earlier scholars have suggested to explain political participation do not influence why 
habitual voters cast a ballot in the elections under study. Measures of political attitudes 
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like strength of partisanship, campaign interest and external efficacy did not influence 
the participation decisions of individuals who voted in all previous elections or those 
who abstained in the same elections.  
 The second and most important contribution of this chapter is its recognition of a 
significant number of respondents who do not appear to fit this habitual voting 
framework.15  Though this population has voted in previous elections, their decision to 
vote in future elections is contingent on changes in their perceptions of the political 
environment and the environment’s orientation toward them.  For these citizens, voting 
is not a habit, instead a decision that is made from one election to the next.   
 Finally, this chapter adds to our understating of how political attitudes influence 
voter turnout. As previously noted, earlier research looking at political attitudes has 
almost exclusively relied on cross-sectional studies. In this chapter, I study political 
attitudes over time and find evidence that attitude change between elections can 
determine when a significant number of Americans will chose to cast a ballot. Such 
findings suggest that the role of attitudes is perhaps more complex than we had 
previously thought and that further investigation into the mechanisms that influence 
attitude change could be beneficial.     
  
 
 
                                                 
15
 I would argue that the number of sporadic voters is likely higher in the general public, especially when 
we consider the mobilizing influence participation in a three-wave panel study can have on individuals 
(Kraut and McConahay 1973; Yalch 1976).  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SURGE AND DECLINE AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I focused on two presidential elections. In this chapter I turn my 
attention to congressional elections. As noted previously, one established pattern 
inconsistent with the habitual voter framework is that of “surge and decline.”  Turnout in 
presidential elections is historically much higher than that of midterm congressional 
elections. Figure 2.1 in Chapter II presents voter turnout in presidential and midterm 
elections from 1980 through 2004.  Over that 24 year period, presidential election 
turnout averaged 53%, while midterm election turnout averaged 37%.  
 If voting is habitual, why does almost 20% of the presidential electorate abstain 
every two years? In this chapter I attempt to answer this question. Building on the 
theoretical background provided by Campbell (1960, 1964, 1966), I examine how 
attitude change between presidential and congressional elections influences individual 
turnout. I begin with a short discussion of the surge and decline literature highlighting 
how theoretically scholars have argued that political attitudes are an important factor in 
explaining surge and decline, yet these assumptions have not been empirically tested. 
Hypotheses derived from this discussion are then empirically tested and the results 
discussed. 
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Surge and Decline 
Campbell (1960;1964;1966) developed the first theory to explain why we observe such 
large fluctuations in turnout in presidential and midterm elections and why the 
President’s party tends to lose seats in Congress in midterm elections. Campbell posits 
that surge and decline is best explained by two key factors: (1) high stimulus elections 
versus low stimulus elections, (2) core voters verses peripheral voters.  
  High stimulus elections are those in which the public places a greater importance 
on the outcome of the election (Campbell 1966, 41).  Campbell states, “off-year 
congressional contests must always present the electorate with a less intensely charged 
situation than the presidential elections which precede and follow” (52). Consequently, 
we observe greater turnout in high stimulus elections followed by a drop in turnout on 
low stimulus congressional elections. 
 The key factor argued by Campbell (1966) to differentiate core and peripheral 
voters is their level of political interest. Core voters have such a high level of political 
interest that they are drawn to the polls in all national elections. On occasion core voters 
are joined at the ballot box by peripheral voters, “whose level of political interest is 
lower but whose motivation to vote has been sufficiently increased by the stimulation of 
the election situation to carry them to the polls” (42).  
 Another thesis offered to explain the surge and decline phenomena comes from 
Kernell (1977), who offered the “negative voting” view as an alternative to Campbell’s 
(1966) proposal. The negative voting thesis contends that the winning presidential 
candidate attracts a number of voters for his party who would generally vote for the 
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opposing party. These new voters, as party supporters, tend to help the party of the new 
president do well in congressional elections further down the ballot. In midterm elections 
the forces that explain the outcome are completely different.  
 As Bron (1990) points out, “for negative voting advocates midterm elections by 
themselves are the focus of attention” (616).  Negative voting scholars argue that 
midterm elections are referenda on the president and the president’s party. However, 
regardless of the president’s popularity, the president’s party tends to lose seats in 
Congress because positive sentiment is less likely than negative sentiment to draw voters 
to the polls.  
For a short period of time, the negative voting thesis gained a large degree of 
attention in the behavior literature (Abramowitz, Cover and Norpoth 1986; Lewis-Beck 
and Rice 1984; Ophenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986 and Tufte 1978).  Yet, later 
scholars tended to find minimal support for the negative voting thesis and they began to 
gravitate back to Campbell’s (1966) surge and decline theory (Bron 1990; Campbell 
1987, 1991, 1997; DeNardo 1980).  
 A common premise both the theories discussed above share is that the differing 
political environments of presidential and congressional elections results in changes in 
the attitudes of the electorate. In the surge and decline literature it is the interest in the 
campaign and the perceived importance of the election determine the fluctuation in voter 
turnout. The negative voting thesis contends it is the negative or positive appraisal of the 
president and the president’s party that explains turnout differences.   
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 A key shortcoming of the previous work examining the surge and decline trend is 
that the research has been primarily dependent on aggregate or cross-sectional data. For 
example, Bron (1990) examined turnout difference between presidential and 
congressional election with National Election Surveys from 1972 to 1992. Campbell 
(1987, 1991, 1997) relied on aggregate turnout results in his study of surge and decline.  
While assumptions are made about the influence short-term forces have on political 
attitudes, attempts to empirically test these assumptions are non-existent. To properly 
determine if attitude change is responsible for fluctuations in turnout between 
presidential and congressional elections panel data is needed. 
 In the previous chapter, I present evidence that sporadic voters are influenced to 
participate in presidential elections by changes in their attitudes from one election to the 
next.  If attitude change drives their behavior in presidential elections, I would also 
contend that the same factors will explain their decision to participate in midterm 
elections. Also, as argued earlier, habitual voters and nonvoters are not expected to be 
influenced by attitude change. Therefore, we would not expect attitude change to 
influence habitual voters’ and nonvoters’ behavior in midterm elections.  
 
H3: Sporadic voters with “positive” attitude changes from one election to the 
next are more likely to vote than sporadic voters with no or negative changes.  
 
H4: Attitude changes from one election to the next will have no influence on 
habitual votes and nonvoter behavior. 
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Developing Measures  
To test these hypotheses for midterm elections I followed the same coding pattern as the 
previous chapter.  I first categorize respondents according to their voting behavior in the 
1968 and1972 presidential elections.  Those classified as habitual voters (N=782) are 
respondents that voted in both 1968 and 1972. Sporadic voters (N=307) are those 
respondents who voted in the 1968 or 1972 election but did not vote in both elections. 
Nonvoters (N=127) are those respondents who failed to vote in both elections.16   
 To account for the role of resources in one’s likelihood of casting a ballot I have 
included a number resource measures (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Education and income are argued to be important 
measures that represent the skill levels individuals bring to the political arena. I measure 
education on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 representing individuals with less than an eighth 
grade education and 10 being those who hold advanced degrees. Income is measured on 
a scale from 1 to 19 with respondents reporting no family income were coded 1, and 
those who reported family incomes over 35,000 were coded 19.  
As an individual’s age they have more opportunities to interact with 
governmental agencies (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995). Such interaction allows them to develop the skills necessary to participate in a 
democratic society. To account for age’s influence on voter turnout, I include a measure 
of the respondent’s age in the analysis.  
                                                 
16
 I used the same method to identify sporadic voters as in the previous chapter. A detailed discussion of 
the coding scheme is reported in Chapter III 
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 Partisan strength is measured as the folded seven-point party identification scale. 
The scale ranges from independents coded 0 through strong partisans coded 3. The 
campaign interest measure ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 being those individuals who 
responded they had no interest in the upcoming campaign and 2 are those who were very 
interested. The importance of voting measure also ranges from 0 to 2. Respondents who 
reported they thought voting was not important were coded 0 and those who stated 
voting was very important were coded 2. 
Most scholars agree that political efficacy is best conceptualized as two 
components, internal and external efficacy (Balch, 1974; Converse, 1972; Craig, 1979; 
Craig & Maggiotto, 1982; Morrell, 2003; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991).  I measure 
external efficacy on a scale with an agree/disagree response to three questions: (1) “I 
don’t think public officials care much what people like me think,” (2) “Generally 
speaking, those we elect to Congress lose touch with the people pretty quickly,” (3) 
“Parties are interested only in people’s votes, not their opinions” (1972, Cronbach’s  = 
.79; 1974 Cronbach’s  = .82). This scale runs from 0 to 3, with those scoring 0 
representing the lowest level of external efficacy and 3 representing those with the 
highest.17 
 I used party thermometer scales to create measures of indifference and 
alienation. Respondents were asked to place the Democrat (pdD) and Republican (pdR) 
parties on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.  To construct a measure of party alienation, I 
added the Democratic party’s position to that of the Republican party and then reversed 
                                                 
17
 As in Chapter III, the internal efficacy scaled poorly (Cronbach’s  = .49) and was therefore not 
included in the model.  
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the scoring ((200- (pdD + pdR)). The resulting measure ranges from 0-200 where a score 
of 200 represents those respondents who gave both parties a score 0 and are, therefore, 
extremely alienated from both parties.  To create a measure of party indifference, I took 
the absolute value of the difference between the Democrat party thermometer score 
(pdD) and that of the Republican party (pdR) and reversed the scoring ((100 – abs(pdD - 
pdR ) ). As a respondent’s score moves closer to 100, the less of a difference she 
perceived between the two parties.18 
 
Methods and Results 
As in Chapter III, the heart of my argument is that sporadic voters differ from habitual 
and nonvoters. For an initial test of this argument, I compare the mean values of the 
independent variables in the two panels. In Table 4.1, I report the mean values for the 
1972-1974 panel. 
Looking at Table 4.1, we see that sporadic voters differ significantly from 
habitual voters and habitual nonvoters on almost every independent variable.  For all but 
three of the independent variables, the difference in means between sporadic voters and 
the other categories is statistically significant. Only the measures of age, candidate 
indifference and candidate alienation were sporadic voters not distinguishable from 
habitual and nonvoters.  These results suggest that sporadic voters are not merely 
habitual voters who, for random reasons, could not vote in the given election because if 
                                                 
18
 Because the 1972-1976 panel study did not ask thermometer rating questions or like/dislike questions 
about candidates for congress I could not develop a measure of candidate alienation as in Chapter III.  
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this were the case difference in means between sporadic voters and the other categories 
not be statistically significant 
Had this been the case, we would have observed little to no difference between 
the two groups.  Instead for most of the independent variables, it appears that sporadic 
voters are unique. Though sporadic voters seem to have statistically different responses 
to the survey questions under study, this is only the first step in determining if these 
observed differences result in variations in behavior.  
 
Table 4.1  Mean Values on Independent Variables for Respondents in the 1972-
1974  NES Panel  
 
Variables 
(Range) 
Habitual 
Voters 
Sporadic 
Voters 
Non-Voters 
Party ID Strength (0-3) 1.79 1.63* 1.28 
Education (1-10) 5.93 5.24* 3.94 
Income (1-19) 12.43 10.11* 8.22 
Age (18-89) 44.8 42.21 42.41 
Campaign Interest (0-2) 1.48 1.02* .67 
Importance of Voting (0-2) 1.92 1.73* 1.31 
External Efficacy (0-3) 1.39 1.12* .51 
Party Indifference (0-100) 81.33 81.92 84.22 
Party Alienation  (0-100) 76.66 79.33* 75.83 
N 765 302 125 
* P <.05 Source: 1972-1776 NES Panel Study. 
 
 
 My hypothesis suggests that sporadic voters’ decisions to vote in the 
congressional election will be determined by their attitude change from the last election. 
To test for this, I was required to compute the change in independent variable values for 
the election. I subtracted the values on the independent variables for the 1972 survey 
from those of the 1974 survey.  Next, I compared the mean change for the independent 
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variables for those sporadic voters who chose to cast a ballot in 1972 to the mean values 
for those sporadic voters who abstained.   
 In Table 4.2, we see that of the 307 sporadic voters in the sample, 125 chose to 
cast a ballot in the 1974 congressional election.19 Those sporadic voters who chose to 
vote had significant increases in campaign interest between the 1972 and 1974 elections.  
Those who chose not to vote had significant decreases in the feeling about the 
importance of voting and their levels of external efficacy.  Sporadic voters who chose to 
abstain in 1974 also had significant increases in their levels of party alienation.   
 
Table 4.2  Change in Values of the Independent Variables for Sporadic Voters 
Between 1972 and 1974 
 
Variables 
(Range) 
Sporadic Voters Who  
Voted in 1974  
Sporadic Voters Who 
Did Not Vote in 1974 
Party ID Strength (0-3) .04 -.04 
Education (1-10) .06 .07 
Income (1-19) 1.11 .91 
Campaign Interest (0-2) .33 .03* 
Importance of Voting (0-2) .12 -.09* 
External Efficacy (0-3) .09 -.10* 
Party Indifference (0-100) 1.11 1.02 
Party Alienation  (0-200) 3.13  8.87* 
N 125 177 
* P <.05 Source: 1972-1776 NES Panel Study. 
 
The bivariate analysis in the Table 4.2 gives some preliminary support to the 
hypothesis that sporadic voters’ decisions to participate in congressional elections are 
influenced by changes in their political attitudes from one election to the next. For a 
                                                 
19
 In the bivariate analysis I only include those measures in which sporadic voters differed from habitual 
voters and habitual nonvoters in the previous analysis.   
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more rigorous test of this hypothesis, I use a binary logit model where sporadic voters 
who chose not to vote in 1974 are coded 0 and those who voted are coded 1.  The 
independent variables in this model are those variables in Tables 4.2 that were 
significant at the bivarate level. 
Four of the coefficients in Table 4.3 are statistically significant and in the 
expected direction. Sporadic voters who reported they had increases in campaign 
interest, their feeling that voting was important and external efficacy between 1972 and 
1974 were more likely to cast a ballot in the 1974 congressional election. Increases in 
party alienation, over the same time period, reduced the likelihood sporadic voter would 
show up on Election Day.7 
 
Table 4.3 Logit Coefficients for Sporadic Voters Casting a Ballot in 1974  
 
 1976 Presidential Election 
Constant  .41 (.35) 
Change in Partisan Strength  .08 (.16) 
Change in Income  .04 (03) 
Change in Campaign Interest   .34** (.19) 
Change in Voting Importance   .09* (.05) 
Change in External Efficacy    .18** (.06) 
Change in Party Alienation   -.011* (.005) 
Pseudo R2   . .132 
N  224 
Wald Chi2  33.62 
*P < .1, **P<.05 one-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 1972-1776 NES Panel Study. 
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 Four of the coefficients in Table 4.3 are statistically significant and in the 
expected direction. Sporadic voters who reported they had increases in campaign 
interest, their feeling that voting was important and external efficacy between 1972 and 
1974 were more likely to cast a ballot in the 1974 congressional election. Increases in 
party alienation, over the same time period, reduced the likelihood sporadic voter would 
show up on Election Day. 
 On a substantive level only two of the variables in Table 4.3 are of importance. A 
one standard deviation increase in one’s campaign interest results in a 12% (+/- .03) 
increase in the likelihood of voting.20 The same rise between 1972 and 1974 in one’s 
external efficacy resulted in an 8% (+/- .02) increase in the probability of tuning out in 
the 1974 election.  
The impact of voting importance and party alienation were substantively 
insignificant. A one standard deviation increase in one’s feeling that voting was 
important only increased the likelihood of voting by 4% (+/- .04). The same increase in 
party alienation reduces one’s likelihood of casting a ballot by 3% (+/- .03). Not only are 
these increases minimal, both of the 95%, confidence intervals are as large or larger than 
the predicted probability suggesting that we cannot be confident that the change is 
different than zero.  
Though the results in Table 4.3 for the 1974 congressional election are not as 
robust as those in the previous chapter for the 1976 and 1992 presidential elections, my 
                                                 
20
 Predicted probabilities were estimated using Clarify, developed by Gary King, Michael Tomz and Jason 
Wittenberg (Tomz et al. 1999 and King et al. 2000). The 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.   
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first hypothesis is supported. Change in two of the attitude measures did explain why 
sporadic voters chose to participate or abstain in the 1974 election. Individuals who were 
classified as sporadic voters were more likely of vote if they felt the election was 
important or they displayed greater levels of external efficacy.  
 While the logit model reported in Table 4.3 suggests that we can accept the first 
hypothesis (which states that sporadic voters are influenced by changes in their political 
attitudes from one election to the next), the second hypothesis asserts that this type of 
behavior is unique to sporadic voters.  To test this hypothesis, I ran two binary logit 
models. In both models, I add all of the respondents from the 1972-1976 panel study so 
that I am no longer simply examining individuals classified as sporadic voters.   
In the first model of Table 4.4, I included all of the change variables from Table 
on page 81.  To compare the behavior of sporadic voters to that of habitual and 
nonvoters, I had to run an interactive model for both elections. I interacted a dummy 
variable, representing sporadic voters, with all of the change in attitude measures to run 
the interactive models.  This allowed me to statistically differentiate how these changes 
influenced the sporadic voters’ behavior compared to individuals who voted in the 
previous two elections (Habitual Voters) and those who did not vote in either election 
(nonvoters).  The dependent variable in both models for each year is coded 1 for those 
respondents who voted in 1974and 0 for those who did not cast a ballot.21 
                                                 
21
 The lowest response an individual could give to the time of residency question in the 1972-1976 panel 
study was less than 4 years. Because I am investigating elections two years apart I could not include a 
control of residential stability as I did in Chapter III.   
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If my second hypothesis is correct, I would expect the results in the first model 
for 1974 to look like earlier cross-sectional studies examining attitudes and voter turnout 
(Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Ashenfelter and Kelly 1975; Cassel and Hill 1981; Citrin 
1974; Craig 1979; Shaffer 1981).  Similar to those studies, the measure of attitude 
change should be significant predictors of voter turnout. However, in the second model 
when I differentiate sporadic voters, I expect the coefficients on the attitude measures to 
only remain significant for sporadic voters.   
Looking at the first model in Table 4.4, we see that several of the attitudinal 
measures behave as earlier literature would suggest.  Those respondents who had 
increases in their feelings of alienation were less likely to vote in the 1974 election. 
Also, those with increases in campaign interest, voting importance and external efficacy 
resulted in one being more likely to cast a ballot in 1976.  
In the second model we see considerable differences.  All but one of the changes 
in attitude measures no longer explain the voting behavior of non-sporadic voters, yet 
when we look at the interaction terms, which represent the influence of these variables 
for sporadic voters, four of the five are statistically significant and in the expected 
direction.  Such results support to the second hypothesis. The sum of the change in 
campaign interest and the change in campaign interest * sporadic- change in campaign 
interest is significantly different than zero value = 4.40~ 2, with one degree of freedom; 
p <0.05. The sum of the change in external efficacy and the change in external efficacy * 
sporadic- change in external efficacy is significantly different than zero value = 2.95  ~ 

2
, with one degree of freedom; p <0.1. The sum of the change in party alienation and 
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the change in party alienation * sporadic- change in party alienation is significantly 
different than zero value = 8.50  ~ 2, with one degree of freedom; p <0.05 .Changes in 
attitudes from 1972 to 1972 did influence the behavior of sporadic voters; however, all 
of the measures except campaign interest do not explain why non-sporadic voters choose 
to vote or abstain in 1974. 
Results in this chapter differ for those in Chapter III in two ways. First, one attitude 
measure, campaign interest, influenced the behavior of habitual voters and nonvoters as 
well as sporadic voters. Yet, substantively the attitude change influences each group 
differently. When all variables are held at their mean value, a one standard deviation 
increase in campaign interest resulted in a 7% (+/-.03) increase in the likelihood of 
voting for habitual voter and habitual nonvoters. For sporadic voters, the same increase 
in campaign interest raises the likelihood of voting by 15% (+/-.02).   
While campaign interest does influence all voters, it has more of a substantive 
impact on sporadic voters. A second difference in this chapter is that other than 
campaign interest, only changes in external efficacy between the two elections appear to 
influence the behavior of sporadic voters.    
 
Conclusion 
Though we have a rich theoretical foundation for the surge and decline phenomena 
observed between presidential and congressional elections, our empirical evidence has 
been limited due to the use of aggregate data.  Using individual panel data in this 
chapter, I have considered two questions: (1) Does attitude change between presidential 
and congressional elections influence voter turnout in midterm elections? (2) Are 
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sporadic voters influenced by attitude change differently than habitual voters and 
nonvoters?  
 
 
Table 4.4 Logit Coefficients for All Respondents Casting a Ballot in 1974  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 1.2** (.06) 
1.2** 
(.05) 
Change in Partisan Strength .05 (.09) 
-.03 
(.11) 
Change in Income .01 (.02) 
.03 
(02) 
Change in Campaign Interest   .39** (.08) 
.16** 
(.05) 
Change in Voting Importance   .05** (.02) 
.03 
(.24) 
Change in External Efficacy .10** (.04) 
-.003 
(.05) 
Change in Party Alienation -.007** (.002) 
.01 
(.03) 
Sporadic * Change in Partisan 
Strength _ 
.09 
(.16) 
Sporadic * Change in Income _ .04 (.10) 
Sporadic * Change in 
Campaign Interest _ 
  .55** 
(.20) 
Sporadic * Change in Voting 
Importance _ 
   .06** 
(.03) 
Sporadic * Change in External 
Efficacy _ 
.18** 
(.05) 
Sporadic * Change in Party 
Alienation _ 
-.008** 
(.002) 
Pseudo R2 .044 .082 
N 985 985 
Wald Chi2 47.81 64.79 
*P < .1, **P<.05 one-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 1972-1776 NES Panel Study. 
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 The results in this chapter suggest that the answer to the first question is yes. All 
respondents in the 1974 election were influenced by their interest in the campaign. 
Those individuals who had an increase in campaign interest between the 1972 and 1974 
election were more likely cast a ballot in the 1974 midterm election. This finding differs 
from that in Chapter III in that attitude change had no impact on the behavior of habitual 
voters and nonvoters.  While changes in campaign interest affected the behavior of all 
voters, its substantive impact differed among the population. Changes in campaign 
interest had over twice the influence on the behavior of sporadic voters as it did on the 
behavior of habitual voters and nonvoters.  
 The findings in this chapter also support the argument, from the previous chapter, 
that attitude change influences sporadic voters differently than it affects habitual voters 
and nonvoters. Not only did changes in campaign interest have greater influence over the 
behavior of sporadic voters, other change in attitude measures only involved sporadic 
voters. Increases in external efficacy and to a lesser degree changes in voting importance 
and party alienation, influenced the likelihood sporadic voters cast a ballot on 1974. 
 Though investigating the debate in the literature between the surge and decline 
theory and the negative voting theory was not an initial aspiration of this chapter, my 
results do speak to the debate. As Campbell (1966) argues, my findings suggest that the 
primary factor explaining turnout in the 1974 congressional election was interest in the 
campaign. Change in partisan strength and party alienation had either no influence or 
minimal influence on the behavior of voters.    
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 Finally, while the results in this chapter support my hypotheses, there are a 
couple of reasons the questions deserves further inquiry. First, I only examine one 
congressional election.  More studies of congressional elections using panel data 
replicating these findings are needed. Second, the 1974 election is unique in that it 
followed the Watergate scandal.  Congressional scholars have noted that most strong 
Republican candidates chose not to run in 1974 resulting in a lower number of 
competitive contests (Jacobson and Kernell 1983). If the political environment was 
significantly different in 1974, the behavior of voters may differ in other congressional 
elections, suggesting that further research could be valuable.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF ELITE MOBILIZATION ON POLITICAL ATTITUDES  
 
 
In the previous two chapters I have demonstrated how changes in political attitudes 
between elections can influence an individual’s decision to participate from one election 
to the next. Yet, as noted in Chapter I, political attitudes have been relegated to minor 
control variables in most contemporary research. The primary measures of interest in the 
participation literature over the past 20 years have been related to socioeconomic status 
and how such factors enable voters to overcome the cost associated with political 
participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  
 However, despite efforts to reduce the cost of voting carried out by the federal 
government and a number of states (i.e. Motor Voter, voter by mail, early voting and 
relaxed absentee ballot restrictions), empirical evidence suggests these policies have had 
little, if any, influence on voter turnout (Berinsky, Burns and Traugott 2001;Erikson 
1981; Knack 1995; Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997; Rhine 1995). Such results, I would 
argue, indicate that participation theory might benefit from returning to the investigation 
of attitudes’ role in motivating behavior and the mechanisms behind attitude change.  
Though there are likely a number of factors that influence attitude change, to date 
we have little empirical evidence in the participation literature, merely speculation 
(Campbell 1960; 1964). One possible influence on political attitudes is elite 
mobilization.  Contact by parties and candidates could strengthen partisan attachments 
and cultivate an interest in the campaign.   
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While we know that mobilization is important in our understanding of political 
participation, we know little about how and why mobilization is effective. As Leighley 
(2002) writes: “assorted approaches to studying political mobilization suggest that we 
have in some senses danced around the issues of how individuals are mobilized and for 
whom mobilization makes a difference” (10).  Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) suggest 
that mobilization primarily provides information about voting and produces selective 
social incentives while only marginally increasing efficacy and party attachments. 
However, the methods used to come to such a conclusion are relegated to a footnote 
(174) and raise questions of model specification.  Moreover, Rosenstone and Hansen 
(1993) ignore political indifference and alienation and the influence of mobilization on 
such attitudes. 
 This chapter progresses in stages, I first replicate participation models that were 
common in the 1970s and early 1980s. Using contemporary data I compare the influence 
of political attitudes to that of more popular measures of skill levels (i.e. education, 
income and age). I next dissect the first model to examine how mobilization influences 
attitudes that effect voter turnout. Finally, I use a technique introduced by Bron and 
Kenny (1986) to determine if political attitudes are mediated by party and candidate 
mobilization.  
  Using survey data from the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, I develop and 
test a model of political participation that supports the findings in the previous two 
chapters, which point to the need to look beyond traditional SES explanations of 
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individual turnout.  Like earlier research, I find that attitudes not only continue to 
influence political participation, several are more influential than SES measures.  
 I also show that one’s attitudes can be influenced by the actions of political elites.  
These findings suggest that mobilization efforts by political elites can help individuals to 
differentiate between parties and candidates by reducing levels of alienation and 
indifference. Mobilization can also strengthen party attachments, increase campaign 
interest and levels of external efficacy.    
 
Attitudes and Participation 
Social psychologists have a long history of studying attitudes, beginning with Hovland 
et al. (1953).  Later, such scholars have added greatly to this earlier work (see Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993; Hasste and Parks 1986; Haugtvedt and Wegener 1994; Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986; Petty and Wegner 1997). However, most of the work in social 
psychology has focused on the role of persuasion, stereotypes, racial attitudes, social 
identities and issue positions.  Very few social psychologists have looked at how such 
attitudes might influence political behavior and none have looked at how attitudes might 
influence the likelihood of voting.  
While political participation scholars have shown little interest in attitudes or 
attitude change, voter choice scholars have continued to focus on the role of political 
attitudes in determining the candidate or party individuals will support in any given 
election. Research which investigates the role of attitudes and vote choice tends to fall 
into three categories; issue voting, economic voting and candidate evaluations. Most of 
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the issue voting research has developed from Key’s (1966) argument which states that 
when given a clear alternative some voters will make their vote choice based on the issue 
stances of the parties or candidates. A number of scholars in the 1970s argued that there 
was little empirical evidence to support issue voting (Page and Brody 1972; Poper 1972; 
Repass 1971; Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976). More recent scholars contend that issue 
voting occurs, however, such voting depends on the issues under study and the decision 
of the candidates and parties to take a stand on such issues (Abramowitz 1995; Alvarez 
1997; Carmines and Stimson 1980; MacDonald, Listhau and Rabinowitz 1991; 1995). 
Retrospective versus prospective voting and pocketbook versus sociotropic 
voting have been the primary topics of debate among political scholars in economic 
voting literature (Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Fiorina 1981; Kinder, Adams and Gronke 
1989; Miller and Wattenberg 1985).  While these scholars differ as to which theory they 
believe to be correct, they all agree that economic conditions influence vote choice.  
Those political scientists interested in candidate evaluations contend that some voters 
make their selections based on perceived personality traits. These researchers investigate 
how attitudes about a candidate’s leadership abilities, honesty, decency, and their ability 
to set a good moral example influence individual vote choice (Goren 2003; Kinder 1986; 
Rahn et al. 1990; Rosenberg and McCafferty 1987). 
If vote choice scholars have continued to study the influence of attitudes, why 
have participation scholars, in more recent years, placed attitudes on the “back burner” 
of research?  One reason may be that most scholars believe the attitudes that influence 
participation are very stable over time (Huddy 2002). However, there is little research to 
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support such a conclusion. For example, party identification has been found to be 
established early in life and highly resistant to change over the course of one’s lifetime 
(Converse and Markus 1979; Markus 1982). A conclusion of the stability in one’s 
attitudes of voting participation depends on how one defines stability.  If, by stability we 
mean not moving from Democrat to Republican overtime, one can conclude that such 
attitudes are very stable.  Yet, if we were to expand our definition to the likelihood of 
placing oneself at the same point along the standard seven point continuum from strong 
Democrat to strong Republican then partisanship looks much less stable overtime 
(Krosnick 1991). 
In fact, results in Chapter III and Chapter IV indicate that attitudes can change 
significantly over just one election cycle. Considering these earlier chapters and previous 
scholarship, I would argue that evaluating attitudes could advance our understanding of 
current participation levels. Consequently I hypothesize:   
Even after controlling for standard measures of SES, measure of individual 
attitudes will influence one’s likelihood of casting a ballot.  
 
Why Is Mobilization Effective? 
The influence of elite mobilization on participation levels is well documented in the 
literature.  Research has shown that when parties and candidates initiate personal 
canvassing activities political participation within those areas will increase (Adams and 
Smith 1980; Gerber and Green 2000; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Wielhouwer and 
Lockerbie 1994).  Others have found that individuals are more likely to participate in 
politics when asked to vote by a candidate, political party or friend (Leighley 2001; 
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Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Calhoun-Brown (1996) found that the relationship 
between black turnout and church attendance can best be explained by the mobilization 
efforts of African-American clergy and other church leaders.   
 In their extensive study of turnout trends over a 36 year period, Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) conclude that variations in mobilization efforts of elites explain over 50% 
of the decrease in voter turnout witnessed since 1960. They argue that variations in 
mobilization efforts were caused by changes in campaign strategies by candidates and 
parties, fewer competitive elections, contested presidential primaries and the decline of 
social movement activity (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 218).   
 Though our understanding of the importance of elite mobilization is quite clear, 
the mechanisms behind mobilization’s influence on turnout is a much cloudier picture.  
The most prominent explanation is that mobilization increases turnout because it lowers 
the cost of voting by providing information about registration, voting locations and 
absentee ballots or providing travel to and from the polling place (Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993; Leighley 2001).   
 On the other hand, as Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) acknowledge: 
Contact with party workers perhaps, reshapes people’s perception and changes 
people’s attitudes about the parties, the candidates, the election and the efficacy 
of political action (174). 
 
What if mobilization does more than lower the cost of voting?  As discussed earlier, 
turnout can be explained by more than simply skill and resource levels.  Individuals 
often respond to changes in the political environment, such as the closeness of elections 
or the dominating ideology of state parties (Beck and Jennings 1979; Campbell et al. 
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1960; Hill and Leighley 1993).  They are also influenced by their attitudes toward the 
alternatives offered in any given election, such as the campaign messages of parties and 
candidates (Brody 1979; Bordy and Page 1973; Zipp 1985). 
 If the political environment and attitudes about that environment influence 
individual decisions to participate in politics, then mobilization may also influence 
individual perceptions.  Contact from candidates and parties may reaffirm party and 
group attachments (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Uhlaner 1989).  By providing voters with 
information about party and candidate issue positions, mobilization may allow 
individuals to better differentiate between the options available.  In other words, 
mobilization may strengthen partisan attachments, increase external political efficacy 
and decrease indifference and alienation. If so, we have the following testable 
hypothesis: 
Individuals who have been contacted by either the candidates or parties will 
display greater feelings of political efficacy, partisanship and campaign interest  
and will be less likely to have feelings of indifference and alienation.  
 
 To test my hypotheses I utilized survey data from National Election Studies for 
the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. These surveys consist of national random 
samples of approximately 2000 respondents conducted in the weeks prior to and after the 
1996 and 2000 presidential elections.  These surveys were selected for two reasons.  
First, they are two recent elections, which allows me to observe if the attitude measures 
found to be important to our understanding participation 1970’s are good predictors of 
behavior 30 years later. Second these surveys contain in depth questions about party 
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mobilization, which will allow me to determine if mobilization influences political 
attitudes and how that influence in turn impacts voter turnout.  
       The analyses progress in three stages.  The first phase develops and test models of 
individual voter turnout for both elections to determine if political attitudes contribute to 
our understanding of political participation in the current political climate. In the next 
phase I explore the influence mobilization had on the attitude measure found to be 
relevant in the stage of analysis. Finally, I test for the mediating effect of mobilization 
suggested in the third hypothesis.   
 
Developing Measures  
External Efficacy is measured the same for both elections.  I measure external efficacy 
on a scale with an agree/disagree response to two questions: (1) “Public officials don't 
care much what people like me think.,” (2) “People like me don't have any say about 
what the government does.,” (1996, Cronbach’s  = .77; 2000 Cronbach’s  = .80).22 
The external efficacy measure ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 representing those possessing 
the lowest levels and 2 representing those with the highest.  
As in previous chapters, I used party thermometer scales to create measures of 
indifference and alienation. Respondents were asked to place the Democrat (pdD) and 
Republican (pdR) parties on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.23  To construct a measure of 
party alienation, I added the Democratic party’s position to that of the Republican party 
                                                 
22
 The questions scaled in this chapter to measure external efficacy differ from those in previous chapters 
due to changes in the questions asked in later versions of the NES.  
23
 The appendix contains a discussion about using thermometer scales in survey data analysis.  
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and then reversed the scoring ((200- (pdD + pdR)). The resulting measure ranges from 
0-200 where a score of 200 represents those respondents who gave both parties a score 0 
and are, therefore, extremely alienated from both parties.  To create a measure of party 
indifference, I took the absolute value of the difference between the Democrat party 
thermometer score (pdD) and that of the Republican party (pdR) and reversed the 
scoring ((100 – abs(pdD - pdR ) ). As a respondent’s score moves closer to 100, the less 
of a difference she perceived between the two parties. 
Respondents were also asked to place the Democrat candidate (pdDC) and 
Republican Candidate (pdRC) on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.  To construct a measure 
of candidate alienation, I added the Democratic candidate’s position to that of the 
Republican candidate and then reversed the scoring ((200- (pdDC + pdRC)). The 
resulting measure ranges from 0-200 where a score of 200 represents those respondents 
who gave both candidates a score 0 and are, therefore, extremely alienated from both 
candidates.  To create a measure of candidate indifference I took the absolute value of 
the difference between the Democrat candidate thermometer score (pdDC) and that of 
the Republican candidate (pdRC) and reversed the scoring ((100 – abs(pdDC - pdRC ) ). 
As a respondent’s score moves closer to 100, the less of a difference she perceived 
between the two parties.24 
                                                 
24
 In both the 1996 and 2000 elections there were prominent third party candidates.  
Unfortunately, the NES only included a few questions about these candidates and none 
about their respective parties.  However, omitting such measures from the models only 
make it more difficult to find the relationships predicted in the hypotheses.  If a large 
number of respondents that I have coded as alienated and indifferent actually support 
third party candidates or parties, there will be a large number of voters where I expect 
nonvoters, resulting in weaker or no findings.   
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Another set of attitudinal factors common to the participation literature are 
measures of motivation such as partisanship and campaign interest (Campbell et al. 
1960; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Strength of partisanship is measured with 
the standard folded 7 point party id scale, were 0 represents no partisanship and 3 
represents strong partisanship.  I expect strong partisans and individuals with high levels 
of campaign interest to be more likely to cast a ballot.   
Except for the measure of mobilization, the same control variables were used in 
both models. Standard SES measures were included to account for difference in 
resources and skills (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  Age was 
recorded as the respondent’s age in years.  Education is a categorical variable ranging 
from 1 for respondents with less than an 8th grade education to 8 for respondents with 
advanced degrees. Family income is also categorical in nature where 1 represents 
respondents whose household income is less than $2,999 and 24 for those $105,000 and 
greater.  I expect all SES measures to have a positive relationship with the dependent 
variable.  
 The final control variable in each model is a measure of party mobilization. In 
the 1996 model, mobilization is coded 0 for those respondents who report not being 
contacted prior to the election and 1 for those that report being contacted in person or by 
phone before the election to support either a party or candidate. The 2000 National 
Election Study survey included questions about contact both in person/phone and by 
mail. Consequently in the 2000 model, I include a third category to my measure of 
mobilization in which respondents coded 0 had no contact prior to the election, coded 1 
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if they were either contacted in person/phone or by mail and coded 2 if contacted in 
person/phone and received contact by mail. This is an improvement over the dummy 
variable used in the 1996 model because it allows for greater variation on the 
independent variable. Like the other controls in the model, I expect mobilization to have 
a positive influence on the likelihood of voting.  
 
Methods and Findings 
The dependent variable in both turnout models are dichotomous measures coded 1 if the 
respondent voted and 0 if the respondent did not vote.  Because the dependent variable is 
binary in nature, logistic estimation techniques will be used for both models.   
 The results of the logit estimates for individual voter turnout in the 1996 and 
2000 elections are reported in Table 5.1.  The results demonstrated in this table illustrate 
that all of the SES coefficients are in the expected direction and statistically significant.  
Strong partisanship, age and family income all have a positive influence on the 
likelihood an individual voted in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections.   
 In the 1996 model, all of the attitudinal measures are in the expected direction, 
with four reaching acceptable levels of statistical significance. In 1996 respondents with 
higher levels of partisan strength and campaign interest were more likely to cast a ballot. 
Higher levels of party alienation and candidate indifference increased the likelihood one 
would abstain.  
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Table 5.1. Logit Estimates for Individual Voter Turnout in the 1996 and 2000 
Elections 
 
 1996 2000 
Constant         -2.29*** (.83) 
      -2.36*** 
(1.01) 
Age       .02*** (.002) 
    .01** 
(.003) 
Education      .23*** (.08) 
     .21*** 
(.06) 
Family Income       .04*** (.006) 
   .05** 
(.003) 
External Efficacy  .04 (.03) 
  .15** 
(.08) 
Strength of Party ID        .29*** (.07) 
  .26** 
(.05) 
Mobilized       .79*** (.12) 
    .82*** 
(.20) 
Campaign Interest      .24*** (.08) 
     .32*** 
(.10) 
Party Indifference -.04 (.06) 
-.08 
(.05) 
Party Alienation     -.39** (.12) 
-.02 
(.02) 
Candidate Indifference   -.07* (.03) 
   -.01** 
(.006) 
Candidate Alienation  -.02 (.03) 
   -.36** 
(.11) 
Log Likelihood -542.169 -490.303 
Wald Chi2 275.39 279.64 
N 1363 1270 
*p<.1**p<.05,***p<.01 two tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 1996 and 2000 NES Studies. 
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Again, in the 2000 model all attitudinal variables are in the expected direction 
and this time five are statistically significant. Individuals with higher levels of external 
efficacy, partisan strength and campaign interest were more likely to vote in the 2000 
election. Higher levels of candidate indifference and alienation reduced one’s likelihood 
of voting.  
Mobilization also has the influence of participation that previous research 
suggests. Individuals who were contacted by one or more of the political parties were 
more likely to vote in both 1996 and 2000.  
The results in Table 5.1 are of value for two reasons. First, they suggest that in 
the present political climate individual attitudes influence citizen’s decisions to 
participate in elections, even after controlling for SES factors. Second, they support the 
argument that concepts like alienation and indifference can be of value in current 
participation studies.   
 While the statistical significance of the coefficients can be used to test my 
hypotheses, logit coefficients are not easily interpreted.  The substantive impact of the 
independent variables on the likelihood of voting can be seen in Tables 5.2.25  In this 
table we see the change in probability of voting when a respondent moves from one 
standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean for each 
independent variable, while holding all others variables at their mean value.    
 
                                                 
25
 Predicted probabilities were estimated using Clarify, developed by Gary King, Michael Tomz and Jason 
Wittenberg (Tomz et al. 1999 and King et al. 2000).     
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Table 5.2  Change in Probability of Voting in 1996 & 2000 From One Std. Above 
and Below Mean For Selected Independent Variables.  
 
 Change in Probability 
1996 
Change in Probability 
2000 
Age .08 (+/-.02) 
.06 
(+/-.03) 
Education .08 (+/-.02) 
.08 
(+/-.03) 
Income .06 (+/-.02) 
.05 
(+/-.03) 
External Efficacy .02 (+/-.03) 
.06 
(+/-.03) 
Strength of Party ID .06 (+/-.03) 
.04 
(+/-.03) 
Mobilized .07 (+/-.03) 
.21 
(+/-.02) 
Campaign Interest  .08 (+/-.04) 
.12 
(+/-.04) 
Party Indifference -.02 (+/-.03) 
-.02 
(+/-.03) 
Party Alienation -.06 (+/-.02) 
-.02 
(+/-.03) 
Candidate Indifference -.05 (+/-.03) 
-.06 
(+/-.03) 
Candidate Alienation -.02 (+/-.03) 
-.08 
(+/-.03) 
Probabilities generated from logit estimates in Table 5.1, 95% confidence intervals in 
parentheses. Change in probability was calculated for each independent variable with all 
others held at their mean value.  
 
 In both 1996 and 2000, a number of the attitude measures have a substantive 
impact on one’s likelihood of casting a ballot.26 More importantly, several of the attitude 
measures have as much or more influence on increasing or reducing one’s probability of 
voting as more prominent measures like education and age. Such findings imply that not 
only is my first hypothesis supported, it suggests  including measures of political 
                                                 
26
 Tests for potential endogeneity problems can be found in the appendix.   
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attitudes in our participation models is as important to our understanding of political 
participation as the more contemporary SES measures.  
 
Mobilization’s Influence on Attitudes 
To test the relationship suggested in the third hypothesis I must first determine if 
mobilization has any influence on the attitudinal measures found to be significant in the 
previous section. To accomplish this I ran four ordered logit models for 1996 and five 
for 2000.  In each model the dependent variable is one of the attitudinal measures.   
 
Table 5.3  Ordered Logit Estimates for Partisan Strength,  Indifference and 
Alienation in 1996 
 
 Partisan 
Strength  
Party 
Alienation 
 
Candidate 
Indifference   
Campaign 
Interest 
Mobilization    .14** (.06) 
-.26** 
(.07) 
.02 
(.03) 
   .18** 
(.07) 
Education   .06* (.04) 
-.12** 
(.05) 
.05 
(.04) 
  .04** 
(.01) 
Income   .06 (.08) 
.13 
(.14) 
.08 
(.06) 
.03 
(.05) 
Age     .06** (.02) 
.002 
(.005) 
-.001 
(.01) 
.02 
(.03) 
Log Likelihood -433.32 -804.16 -387.92 -693.98 
Wald Chi2 198.39 301.35 225.21 325.13 
N 1363 1363 1363 1363 
*p<.1**p<.05,***p<.01 one tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 1996 and 2000 NES Studies. 
 
The independent variable of interest in each model is the measure of mobilization.  This 
variable is coded the same as before.  Controls were also included for SES factors that 
  99 
 
the literature suggests will also influence political attitudes (Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995).  These measures include levels of education, age and income.  All control 
variables are coded the same as discussed in the previous section.   
Looking at Table 5.3 we see that of the mobilization has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on party alienation.  Mobilization has a positive and 
significant influence on partisan strength and campaign interest. More substantively, 
when the coefficients in the party alienation model are converted to predicted 
probabilities, the substantive impact of mobilization is quite large.  When a respondent 
was contacted prior to the election, the probability of feeling alienated decreases by .08 
(+/-.3).  When we compare this change to that of education, a respondent would need to 
go from being a high school dropout to graduating college before a similar decrease in 
alienation is observed.   
In Table 5.4 we see even stronger results.  In three of the four attitudinal models 
mobilization has a statistically significant influence, increasing internal and external 
efficacy and reducing alienation.  The magnitude of mobilization’s influence is even 
larger than that observed in the 1996 model.  Respondents who were contacted in person 
and received contact by mail increased their likelihood of displaying feelings of partisan 
strength and external efficacy by .22 (+/- .04) and .10 (+/- .03) respectively.  Similarly, 
contact by the parties and candidates reduce the likelihood of candidate alienation by .08 
(+/- .03).     
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Table 5.4  Ordered Logit Estimates for Partisan Strength, External Efficacy,  
Candidate Indifference, Candidate Alienation and Campaign Interest in 
2000 
 
 
 Candidate 
Indifference 
 
Candidate 
Alienation 
 
External  
Efficacy  
 
Partisan 
Strength  
Campaign  
Interest 
Mobilization .08 (.06) 
-.23* 
(.12) 
.15* 
(.08) 
   .19** 
(.08) 
   .22** 
(.12) 
Strength of 
PiD 
    -.47*** 
(.11) 
   -.32*** 
(.09) 
.12* 
(.06) 
  .06* 
(.04) 
  .06* 
(.04) 
Education .05 (.05) 
-.27** 
(.11) 
     .20*** 
(.04) 
 .06 
(.08) 
 .06 
(.08) 
Income   .03 (.04) 
.09 
(.11) 
.07 
(.06) 
.06 
(.04) 
 .08* 
(.05) 
Age -.003 (.002) 
-.01** 
(.005) 
-.004 
(.003) 
    .09** 
(.03) 
.05 
(.07) 
Log 
Likelihood -1867.351 -258.803 -899.421 -346.19 -396.23 
Wald Chi2 40.46 43.72 29.13 56.02 21.69 
N 1270 1270 1270 1270 1270 
*p<.1**p<.05,***p<.01 one tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 1996 and 2000 NES Studies. 
 
The Mediating Effect of Mobilization 
The results in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 suggest that mobilization can have statistical and 
substantive impact on individual attitudes. However, as of yet, we have no evidence of a 
mediating relationship between mobilization, attitudes and political participation 
influence on one’s decision to participate in politics.  Before this can be established, we 
must compare the change in magnitude of mobilization’s influence in the model 
including the attitudinal variables to that of a model with the attitudinal variables 
removed (Bron and Kenny 1986; Miller and Peterson 2003).   
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 If mobilization has the mediating effect, we would expect to see the substantive 
impact of mobilization on the likelihood of voting increase once the attitudinal variables 
are removed from the model. To test this I replicated the models on page 95 in Table 5.5, 
removing the attitude measures. I then compared the substantive impact of mobilization 
on the dependent variable in the model with the attitudes removed to the results observed 
in the complete model (Table 5.1). If the influence of mobilization increased it would 
suggest a mediating relationship (Bron and Kenny 1986; Miller and Peterson 2003).   
 
Table 5.5. Logit Estimates for Voting Without Attitudinal Variables  
 
 1996 2000 
Constant         -4.03*** (1.35) 
      -2.83*** 
(1.33) 
Age       .02*** (.002) 
    .01** 
(.005) 
Education      .25*** (.10) 
     .16*** 
(.07) 
Family Income       .04*** (.01) 
   .01** 
(.004) 
Mobilized       .76*** (.28) 
    1.21*** 
(.43) 
Log Likelihood -561.898 -602.032 
Wald Chi2 256.42 344.94 
N 1363 1270 
***p<.01 two tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: 1996 and 2000 NES Studies. 
  
In Table 5.6 we see that all of the controls for socioeconomic status behave as 
expected. Respondents with higher levels of education and family incomes were more 
likely to cast a ballot in 1996 and in 2000. Older Americans were also more likely to 
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participate in both elections.  Finally, those individuals who were contacted (mobilized)  
by the political parties or candidates were more likely to cast a ballot.   
 
Table 5.6  Change in Mobilization’s Substantive Impact When Attitudinal 
Variables are Removed from Model. 
 
 All Variables in Model Attitudinal Variables 
Removed 
Mobilization 1996 .07 (+/-.03) 
.20 
(+/-.03) 
Mobilization 2000 .21 (+/-.02) 
.45 
(+/-.02) 
Change in probability of voting when individual has been mobilized. Probabilities in the first column 
generated from logit coefficients in Table 5.1. Probabilities in second column generated from logit 
coefficients in Table 5.6. 
Source: 1996 and 2000 NES Studies. 
 
 
 In Table 5.6 are the changes in the probability of voting for mobilized individuals 
in 1996 and 2000, when all other variables are held at their mean value. In the first row 
we see that in the 1996 full model, party contact increased the likelihood of voting by 
about .07. When the attitudes are removed for the 1996 model the substantive influence 
mobilization almost triples increasing to .20. In the full 2000 model, mobilization had an 
even greater influence on one’s probability of casting a ballot, increasing it 20%. 
Removing the attitude measures from the 2000 model results in the substantive impact of 
party contact more than doubling.  
 The results in Table 5.6 support my second hypothesis that there is a mediating 
relationship between mobilization and political attitudes. This suggests that contact by 
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parties and candidates can have a positive influence on attitudes, which, in turn, results 
in an increase in the likelihood of increased voter participation.27  
 
Conclusion 
The results in this chapter address two key areas of the participation literature. First, 
using survey data from the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, I develop and test a 
model of political participation. The findings from this model suggest the need to look  
beyond traditional SES explanations of individual turnout (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 
1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  
In both 1996 and 2000 individual attitudinal measures predicted voter turnout as 
well or better than levels of education, income and age. Respondents with higher levels 
of external efficacy, stronger partisan attachments and greater campaign interest were 
more likely to cast a ballot in both campaigns.   Also, the often overlooked attitudes of 
alienation and indifference were found to be relevant to our understanding of 
contemporary elections. Individuals who displayed higher levels of political alienation 
and indifference were more likely to abstain on Election Day.  
 Second, I find that individual attitudes are mediated by the actions of elites. 
Individuals contacted by parties and candidates were more likely to display higher levels 
of internal and external political efficacy and less likely to display feelings of 
indifference and alienation.  Consequently, these results suggest mobilization does more 
                                                 
27
 I do not intend to imply that attitudes cannot have a direct effect on voter turnout. However, the previous 
chapters suggest that attitudes change over time. The findings in this chapter imply that one of the factors 
that could explain attitude change is party mobilization.   
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than simply reduce the costs of voting as suggested in prior research (Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993; Leighley 2001).   The efforts by political elites can also help individuals to 
differentiate between parties and candidates, while at the same time facilitate the 
development of stronger political attachments, campaign interest and greater levels of 
external efficacy.     
Though the findings in this chapter begin to answer the question as to how elite 
mobilization is effective, other questions still remain. For one, we know that political 
elites strategically target mobilization efforts (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Leighley 
2001).  How might the results observed in this project change if mobilization efforts 
were broadened?   
 We know that minority populations are less likely to be contacted by candidates 
or parties (Leighley 2001).  These are also the populations who have been found to have 
more negative attitudes about politics in general (Buzan 1980; Welsh et al. 1973).  As 
we move forward with this line of research, we may find that mobilization influences 
segments within the population differently.    
The findings in this chapter suggest that if political elites were to broaden their 
mobilization efforts beyond that of habitual voters it could have an influence on overall 
participation rates. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, a sporadic voters’ 
decision to participate in any give election are influenced by attitude change from one 
election to the next. If, as this chapter demonstrates, elite mobilization can influence 
attitudes, it would follow that elite mobilization of sporadic voters would bring more 
voters to the ballot box.  
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Finally, this chapter expands our theoretical understanding of the relationship 
between mobilization and voter turnout. Earlier scholars had posited that mobilization 
increased turnout by reducing the cost of voting because it proved resources such as 
information and transportation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Lieghley 2001). While I 
don’t disagree with this assertion, I do think it is incomplete. Contact by parties and 
candidate can also strengthen partisan attachments, increase campaign interest and give 
individuals a greater feeling that government cares about their problems.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  106 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The trend in the political participation literature over the past 30 years has been the 
influence of skill levels and how to reduce the cost of voting. Over the same time period, 
the federal government implemented Motor Voter, and a number of states implemented 
early voting, vote by mail and relaxed absentee voting restrictions. Yet, while the cost of 
voting has been reduced, we have observed little change in voter turnout.  In this 
dissertation, I have attempted to move political participation research in a new direction. 
If the cost associated with voting has been reduced and participation levels have not 
changed, perhaps we have focused too much on the skills individuals bring to the 
political arena and too little on what they think about the options with which they are 
presented in each election. 
 More specifically, I posit that most Americans will decide whether to cast a 
ballot or not based on their individual attitudes about the parties, the particular 
candidates who are running for office and their overall interest in the election. To boost 
citizens’ interest in elections parties, candidates and interest groups attempt to mobilize 
their supporters with campaign ads and neighborhood canvassing efforts.  Elections 
garner a great deal of media attention. Yet, the context of elections changes from year to 
year, different candidates run for office, the issues emphasized change and the media’s 
coverage often varies. Participation theories that focus on the skill levels of citizens or 
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suggest that voting is a habit acquired over one’s lifetime ignore the contextual 
differences between elections and how those changes might influence participation rates.  
 Because of the theoretical limitations of the two most dominant approaches to the 
study of political participation, I posed three questions: when observing individuals’ 
voting patterns over time do they fit neatly into the categories of habitual voters and 
habitual nonvoters; if a third category does exist, can attitude change be used as an 
effective measure as to the likelihood of  an individual within this third category casting 
a ballot; and finally, if attitudes, such as partisan strength, campaign interest and external 
efficacy, influence the voting behavior of contemporary voters, how might the 
mobilization efforts of parties and candidates moderate political attitudes? Empirical 
evaluations of these questions suggest that we should expand our existing theories of 
political participation and mechanisms that explain why political mobilization is 
effective. 
Summary of Findings 
After observing the voting behavior of Americans in two panel studies conducted 20 
years apart, there seems to be no pattern for individuals to fit into the two category 
models of habitual voters and habitual nonvoters. About 25% of the voting age 
population reported voting in some elections and abstaining in others, suggesting the 
need for a third category to be added to the category models of voters, that of sporadic 
voters. Sporadic voters, while voting in one election, do not appear to have acquired a 
habit.  
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 Though sporadic voters move in and out of the voting population, it is not the 
simple result of circumstance. This dissertation suggests that they make their decisions 
to participate based on their attitudes from one election to the next. Sporadic voters who 
increased in their partisan attachments, campaign interest and external efficacy between 
the 1972 and 1976 or between the 1990 and 1992 elections were more likely to cast a 
ballot. Also, over the same elections those sporadic voters who increased in their feeling 
of party alienation were less likely to turn out on Election Day.  
 Like Plutzer (2002), I find that a large number of Americans display habitual 
behavior. Individuals classified as habitual voters and habitual nonvoters differed from 
sporadic voters in that changes in their attitudes from one election to the next had no 
influence on their voting decisions. Yet, habitual voters and habitual nonvoters did not 
differ from sporadic voters in the amount of attitude change between elections, which 
would suggest they are repeating a behavior regardless of changes in their attitudes about 
the election.   
 This dissertation also suggests that individuals respond differently to 
congressional elections than presidential elections. The surge and decline phenomena is 
well established in political science literature. However, most of the work has been 
theoretical or empirically examined with aggregate data limiting our understanding at the 
individual level. 
 All respondents in the 1974 election were influenced by their interest in the 
campaign. Those individuals who had an increase in campaign interest between the 1972 
and 1974 election were more likely cast a ballot in the 1974 midterm election. This 
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finding differs from that in presidential elections in that attitude change had no impact 
on the behavior of habitual voters and nonvoters.  While changes in campaign interest 
affected the behavior of all Americans, its substantive impact differed among the 
population. For habitual voters and habitual nonvoters, campaign interest had about half 
the influence on turnout as it did among sporadic voters. 
 One similarity between congressional and presidential elections is that attitude 
change influences sporadic voters differently than it affects habitual voters and 
nonvoters. Not only did changes in campaign interest have greater influence over the 
behavior of sporadic voters, other change in attitude measures only influenced sporadic 
voters. Increases in external efficacy and, to a lesser degree, changes in voting 
importance and party alienation, influenced the likelihood sporadic voters cast a ballot in 
congressional elections. 
 There have been two competing theories in the literature for the explanation of 
higher turnout in presidential elections than in midterm elections. The first suggestion, 
introduced by Campbell (1960,1964,1966), argues that the drop in turnout observed in 
congressional elections is the result of a drop in interest because midterm elections are 
less dynamic events. The second posits that the lower turnout in midterm election is due 
to attitudes about the president and the president’s party (Abramowitz, Cover and 
Norpoth 1986; Kernell 1977; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984; Ophenheimer, Stimson, and 
Waterman 1986 and Tufte 1978). These authors suggest that individuals with negative 
attitudes about the President and the President’s party will be more likely to turnout in 
midterm elections, and those with positive attitudes stay home resulting in lower turnout.   
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The results in this dissertation add to the discourse relating to higher voter 
turnout for a presidential election. As Campbell (1966) argues, my findings suggest that 
the primary factor explaining turnout in the 1974 congressional election was interest in 
the campaign. Change in partisan strength and party alienation had either no influence or 
minimal influence on the behavior of voters.    
While the findings in Chapter III and Chapter IV suggest that changes in an 
individual voter’s attitudes from one election to the next influence the behavior of a 
significant number of Americans, Chapter V’s findings move the discussion in a slightly 
different direction. First, Chapter V’s findings establish that individual attitudinal 
measures predicted voter turnout as well or better than levels of education, income and 
age in contemporary elections. Individuals with higher levels of external efficacy, 
stronger partisan attachments and greater campaign interest were more likely to cast a 
ballot. Also, the often overlooked attitudes of alienation and indifference were found to 
be relevant to our understanding of present-day elections. Individuals who displayed 
higher levels of political alienation and indifference were more likely to abstain on 
Election Day.  
 Second, I find that attitudes are mediated by the actions of political parties and 
candidates. Individuals contacted by parties and candidates were more likely to display 
higher levels of external political efficacy and less likely to display feelings of 
indifference and alienation.  Therefore, these results suggest mobilization does more 
than simply reduce the costs of voting as suggested in prior research (Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993; Leighley 2001).   The efforts by political elites can also help individuals to 
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differentiate between parties and candidates, while at the same time facilitate the 
development of stronger political attachments, campaign interest and greater levels of 
external efficacy.     
 
Implications and Conclusion 
Whereas I agree with Plutzer’s (2002) thesis that individual factors suggested by earlier 
authors attempting to explain political participation are incomplete (i.e. socioeconomic 
status), the results in this dissertation suggest his habitual voter framework 
oversimplifies the American electorate. While I also find that a majority of the electorate 
repeats the same behavior from one election to the next regardless of changes in 
individual or attitudinal characteristics, my findings suggest a significant number of 
Americans change their behavior depending upon their perceptions at the time of the 
election.  
    The implications of my results call into question the way we study voter 
turnout and the theoretical approaches we use to explain participation levels. The 
findings in this dissertation stress the need for more and longer panel studies if we are to 
get a clear picture of the connection between our concepts, indicators and the 
mechanisms influencing behavior. Because the context of elections changes over time 
we need to observe the same individuals and their behavior in different elections. 
   More importantly, I would argue that we should pay less attention to the 
instrumental benefits of voting, which are at the heart of the cost/benefit paradigm and 
reconsider how voting, as an expressive act, can help us to understand why some 
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individuals decide to cast a ballot and others do not. (Riker and Ordeshook 1973; 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Some scholars have compared expressive voting to the 
way people support a sports team and at other times ignore the games (Brennan and 
Hamlin 1998; Tullock 2000).  
 For example, because I grew up in Kentucky, I am a fan of the Kentucky 
Wildcats basketball team. The attention I give to the Wildcat basketball season varies 
from year to year. If they recruit a group of promising players, I will likely watch more 
games. If the team hires a new coach, that could mean a change in its style of play and 
could entice me to be more interested in the season. My interest could be sparked by 
something as simple as a phone call from my father to remind me of the yearly game 
against Kentucky’s rival Indiana.  There are costs associated with my watching the 
Wildcats’ games and being involved in the team’s season. I have to insure I have a two 
hour block of time free to watch a game. I have to take the time to find the time and 
channel on which the game is being played. Yet, only on rare occasions do the costs of 
watching a game play any role in my decision to tune into the game. I also know my 
watching has no influence on the game’s outcome. Finally, the only benefit I receive is 
the thrill of watching the game and hopefully the satisfaction of seeing my team win.   
 Similarly, I contend that many Americas (i.e. sporadic voters) show up at the 
polls because a candidate sparks their interest or the issues at the center of the campaign 
are important to the those individuals.  They may also vote because they received a call 
or a knock on the door reminding them that an election is approaching and their party 
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could use their support. Again, for these individuals voting is not the result of some 
cost/benefit analysis they vote to express support for a party, issue or candidate.   
I also support Aldrich’s (1993) argument that in most cases voting is both low in 
cost and low in benefit. If true, it explains why I found that for some voters moving one 
or two points between elections on the partisan strength or external efficacy measures 
can bring them to the polls or keep them at home.  Yet, a number of questions remain 
unanswered before we can develop a comprehensive theory explaining sporadic voter 
behavior.  
In Chapter V I attempt to answer a central question of this dissertation, what are 
the mechanisms that link attitude change to change in voting behavior? The findings are 
limited by the data and only scratch the surface of how attitude change is linked to 
change in voting behavior. My findings suggest that elite mobilization can mediate 
individual attitudes. However, I do not directly link mobilization to attitude change.  
Mobilization is only one of many contextual variables we might expect to 
influence attitude change.  As noted in Chapter II, elections do not occur in a vacuum.  
Citizens are exposed to media coverage and conversations with friends and family.  This 
exposure shapes their attitudes, about themselves and their place within the political 
sphere. This exposure can also change from election to election.  Individuals move. They 
get promotions and lose their jobs. The parties change candidates and issues.   All of 
these changes could lead to a change in one’s attitudes toward his or her political 
environment and the environment’s orientation to the individual. 
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Before we can accurately explain and predict the behavior of sporadic voters, we 
need to examine how all varying political context influence attitude change. Do the issue 
positions stressed in the campaign strengthen or weaken partisan attachments, campaign 
interest or external efficacy? How might media coverage influence attitude change? I 
have only investigated presidential and congressional elections; what about state and 
local elections, where turnout can be 8-10%.  
In closing, I would contend that understanding the behavior of sporadic voters 
should be a primary goal of participation scholars. If my findings, and those of Plutzer 
(2002), are correct there is little to no variability in the behavior of habitual voters and 
habitual nonvoters. If one of our primary goals is to accurately explain and predict voter 
turnout, sporadic voters are the most logical target for our analysis. Because their 
behavior changes over time depending upon their attitudes about the electoral 
environment, understanding the relationship between environmental change and attitude 
change would lead to a more comprehensive theory of political participation.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Feeling thermometer scores were introduced in the 1960s as an attempt to improve upon 
the 5 point Likert Scale from the 1930s. The thermometer score ranges from 0 to 100 
and allows from greater variation than the 5 point strongly agree to strongly disagree 
scale.  While use of the measure as both independent and dependent variables has been 
very common for the last 45 years, a few scholars have questioned their reliability 
(Brody1985; Green 1988 and Wilcox, et al. 1989). The problem with using thermometer 
scores is inter-personal incomparability.  In other words, if respondents interpret the 
scale differently it makes it difficult to compare scores across individuals. One should be 
most concerned with this problem if the thermometer score is being used as a dependent 
variable (see Hetherington 1998). In none of the models in this dissertation is a 
thermometer score used as a dependent variable.  
 A second concern is how thermometer scores perform as measures of individual 
opinion. Though thermometer scores cannot be treated as interval measures, research has 
found that “for most people feeling thermometer[s] convey at least as much –if not 
more-information as a 5 or 7 point scale” (Winter and Berinsky 1999, 17). As Winter 
and Berinsky (1999) suggest, I use two thermometer scores to obtain my measures. For 
example, if one respondent placed the Republican Party at 30 and the Democratic Party 
at 75 on the thermometer scale, I would argue that she clearly sees a difference between 
the parties. Yet, if another respondent rated the parties as 56 and 65 respectively, and 
behaved as the previous respondent, it would actually bias me against finding the 
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relationship that my hypothesis suggests. Though I do not suggest that I have an interval 
measure, because I do use them as independent variables and I difference the responses 
from two questions I think my use of thermometer scores in this dissertation are reliable.  
 
Endogeneity in Survey Data 
Scholars have noted the potential problems of endogeneity when using measures 
of attitudes in an attempt to predict political participation (Finkel 1985, 1987; Junn 1991; 
Leighley 1991; Madsen 1987 and Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).  These authors 
note that there are often reciprocal effects associated with political participation. For 
instance, one’s partisan strength and political alienation not only influence his or her 
likelihood of voting; the act of voting can influence one’s level of partisan strength and 
political alienation. Ignoring this reciprocal relationship can inflate the predicted 
influence of attitudes on one’s decision to participate in the political process.  
 In this dissertation, I address this issue in two ways. First, I have designed my 
models to insure measures of attitudes are taken prior to the act of voting. All attitude 
measures are those asked in the pre-election surveys. Next, I subtract the attitude 
measures from the election under study from those taken in the previous election. 
Therefore, my measure is not a simple measure of attitudes prior to the election, but one 
of attitude change from one election to the next (except for Chapter V).  
 One hypothetical problem that remains is that even though the respondents were 
surveyed prior to the election they may have already made their decision about 
participating and adjusted their answers accordingly. If they are also sophisticated 
  128 
 
enough to make such adjustments from one election to the next, my results might remain 
biased. Though I think this is highly unlikely, it is possible and must be taken into 
consideration.  
 Because in two of my chapters I use panel data, there is also the chance that the 
act of voting enhances attitudes in subsequent elections. Finkel (1985) found that voting 
could increase levels of political efficacy in future elections. Yet, in his models he 
constrains the attitude scores to be equal over time. When these constraints are relaxed, 
the reciprocal relationships in the panel are no longer significant (Finkel 1985, 902).  
Tables 3.1-A and 3.2-A suggest that attitude change is the same between elections, 
regardless if the individual is a habitual, sporadic or nonvoter. However, it is only among 
the sporadic voters that I find attitude change influencing behavior. This might explain 
why Finkel (1985) had insignificant results when he relaxed his constraints.  
 A second approach to accounting for the potential problem of endogeneity is to 
use econometrics. Previous scholars have used two-stage least squares to correct for 
endogeneity between independent and dependent variables (Leighley 1991; Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady 1995). Unfortunately, they were using participation scales as 
dependent variables and my research uses dichotomous dependent variables, which are 
not appropriate for two-stage least squared models. 
 Encouragingly, advances in technology allow two-step estimators to be used to 
obtain coefficients estimates with dichotomous dependent variables (see Newey 1987 
and Wooldridge 2002). The ivprobit command in STATA 9 allows for the estimation of 
a two-step model with a dichotomous dependent variable. A second advantage the 
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ivprobit model is that the output also contains a Wald statistic and p-value for the test of 
the hypothesis that all of the slope coefficients are jointly zero. If the Wald test statistic 
is insignificant, one cannot reject the null that there is no endogeneity. If this is the case 
a regular probit or logit regression would be more appropriate (see Wooldridge 2002). 
 To ensure that endogeneity was not a problem, I estimated all the models 
reported in Chapters III through V as two-step equations. In Chapter III and Chapter IV I 
used change in income, change in education and change in age as instrumental variables. 
It is very unlikely that these variables would be determined by voting so they are very 
likely exogenous.  The results in Table 3.8, when estimated as an ivprobit model, had in 
insignificant Wald test of exogeneity (Prob> chi2 = .26). When table 3.9 was estimated 
as an ivprobit, again the Wald test of exogeneity was insignificant (Prob> chi2 = .86). In 
Chapter IV, I estimated Table 4.4 as an ivprobit model and the Wald test suggested a 
probit or logit model was more appropriate (Prob> chi2 = .71).   
 Chapter V is the only chapter that uses cross-sectional data. This makes concern 
about endogeneity greater because I am not using change in attitudes measures as in the 
previous chapters. To reduce this concern, I ran the two models in Table 5.1 as two-step 
equations. For both the 1996 and 2000 models I used education, income, age, black and 
Hispanic as instrumental variables. As in the analyses in previous chapters I believe 
these demographic measures are exogenous. When run as two-step equations, both the 
1996 (Prob> chi2 = .57) and the 2000 (Prob> chi2 = .14) models had insignificant Wald 
test of exogeneity. Again, the results suggest that a probit or logit model is the most 
appropriate.  
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Table 3.1-A Mean Change in Values of the Independent Variables 1972-1976. 
 
Variables 
(Range) 
Habitual 
Voters 
Sporadic 
Voters 
Non-Voters 
Party ID Strength (0-3) .01 -.07 .03 
Income (1-19) 1.33 .78 .52 
Campaign Interest (0-2) .08 .07 .12 
Importance of Voting (0-2) -.003 -.04 .1 
External Efficacy (0-2) .01 -.03 .01 
Party Alienation  (0-100) 7.94 9.2 11.9 
Moved .23 .38 .36 
N 782 307 127 
None of the differences significant at the .05 level.  
Source: 1972-1976 NES Panel Study. 
 
 
 
Table 3.2-B Mean Change in Values of the Independent Variables 1990-1992. 
 
Variables 
(Range) 
Habitual 
Voters 
Sporadic 
Voters 
Non-Voters 
Party ID Strength (0-3) .08 .06 .04 
Income (1-19) .94 .98 .71 
Campaign Interest (0-2) .12 .16 .09 
External Efficacy (0-2) .03 .04 -.02 
Party Alienation  (0-100) 6.44 7.82 9.92 
Moved .23 .38 .36 
N 552 217 332 
None of the differences significant at the .05 level.   
Source: 1990-1992 NES Panel Study. 
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